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ABSTRACT 
 
The thesis examines the relationship between political financing regime and public trust 
in political parties in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Political parties require financial 
sources for electoral campaigns and operational administration. The shortage in 
financing may cause an interference of the third-parties interested in the decision-
making of a political party. Scandals related to the topic of illegal funding of political 
parties are not rare in the Baltic States that undermine public confidence in political 
parties. In this sense, public funding is a primary a tool that can generate a balance in 
political financing regime, provide democratic elections and hence increase trust level in 
political parties.     
A hypothesis that public funding generates a higher level of trust in political parties 
tested in the thesis is true in the case of Estonia while in the case of Latvia and 
Lithuania other factors that influence trust in political parties are found. 
 
Keywords: political financing, political financing regime, public funding, private 
funding, public trust in political parties, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania.   
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ABBREVIATIONS 
 
PPA – Political Party Act of Estonia 
LFPP(lv) – Law on Financing of Political Organisations (Parties) of Latvia 
LFPP(lt) - Law on Funding of Political Parties and Political Campaigns and 
Control  of Funding of Republic of Lithuania       
LPP(lv) - Law on Political Parties of Latvia 
LPP(lt) - Law on Political Parties of Republic of Lithuania 
PPFSC - The Political Party Finance Supervision Committee of Estonia (ERJK) 
KNAB – The Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau of Latvia  
CEC – The Central Election Commission of the Republic of Lithuania  
VC – the Venice Commission  
WVS - World Value Survey 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Political parties come to a government to work for the society. They come through 
elections, through people’s will and trust. It is expected of them to work in the interests 
of society. It is also expected that no third party will influence the decision-making of 
political parties and hence the life of ordinary citizens, a brunch, a region or the whole 
country. People are willing to vote for those parties whose ideology is closer to them 
and who will represent them later in the parliament. However, money plays a significant 
role in this process as it is the primary source of the conduct of a political party, 
administration of elections and political campaigns. Money helps political parties to 
shape public opinion during a political campaign and even to win elections. With more 
financial resources, a political party gets more opportunities to reach the voter and 
convince him to support the party. Political campaigns become more expensive and 
require more financial resources to obtain an electoral support. The lack of financing 
can become a reason for a political party to support some third party decisions or even 
lobby some interests in exchange for financial benefits. The voter loses trust in political 
parties because of numerous scandals that provide an evidence of buying of access to a 
decision making process in a country. Consequently, “political parties are rated worse 
than courts, legislative or executive government institutions” (Transparency 
International, 2015). Hence, it is possible to assume that political parties’ financing is 
correlated with some level of public trust.   
There are well-developed rules that govern the funding of political parties in 
European countries. The Council of Europe and the United Nations conducted a variety 
of groundworks and analytical reports on the topic of political party financing. The 
European Commission for Democracy through Law (the Venice Commission (VC), 
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2001) formulated and adopted specific recommendations that describe basic principles 
and rules on political party financing and electoral campaigns. These rules consist of the 
regulatory framework as for the public, the same for the private funding of political 
parties. Public funding is available for those parties that have reached threshold 
requirements. For instance, free access to media is considered an indirect public funding 
of political parties. Private funding is a traditional source of political financing. It is 
regulated through bans and limits on donations made by one donator during one 
calendar year; in many countries, it should be an open list of persons who have made 
any contribution to a party. A state should establish limitations on spending of a 
political party. Additionally, political parties are obligated to present their financial 
reports to oversight institutions. The contemporary experience shows that political 
financing is narrowed down mostly to public funding regime with strong functions of 
oversight institutions.  The aim of the political financing regulation is to provide equal 
rights for all participants of a political system. Nevertheless, each country is unique and 
requires some unique modifications in political financing regime. The core concept is to 
find a balance between all elements of political financing regime.  
The aim of this thesis is to study political financing regimes in the Baltic States 
and to find what kind of impact it has on public trust in political parties in each country. 
The emphasis in this thesis is made on public funding of political parties. An 
introduction of public funding is usually provided as the balancing element in political 
party financing regime. It creates a more equal playing field for different political 
parties. The main argument of the introduction of public funding is that political parties 
represent groups of citizens. Hence, they have to be financed by the public means. It is 
expected that receiving state subsidies, political parties conduct their activity on behalf 
of public interests. Consequently, trust in political parties derives from the conduct of 
political parties. In this sense, public trust is an institutional economiser that has strong 
ties to political financing regime.            
The theoretic chapter of this thesis highlights basic concepts and legal principles 
of political party financing regime that are applied both to party activity and to electoral 
campaigns.  A political financing regime rests on two pillars: (1) regulatory rules and 
measurements of political financing; and (2) a regulatory body that monitors political 
parties’ activity and its compliance with the established standards.  
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The empirical chapter presents a small-N case study. It is devoted to the 
comparative analysis of public and private funding and other elements of political 
financing regime such as free media access, reporting mechanism and the role of 
oversight institutions in this process in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Despite 
possessing similar features of political development and following the same 
recommendations of the Venice Commission and the Council of Europe, all three case 
studies have to some extent different modifications of elements of political party 
financing regime. In the last subchapter, trust in political parties is analysed parallel to 
the development of political system and party financing regime in each country. The 
case study shows that an implementation of public funding in Estonia helped to stabilise 
a political system that had an influence on the higher level of public trust in political 
parties in the first half of the 1990s. The cases of Latvia and Lithuania are different; 
public funding was established relatively late. The other factors had a significant impact 
on public trust in political parties.    
The primary data sources of the comparative analysis are national legislation on 
political financing and data and political finance data of the International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance; data on public trust on political parties of the 
World Value Survey (Wave 3 and Wave 5) and reports of Eurobarometer, etc.   
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CHAPTER 1. THEORETICAL APPROACH 
 
A political party is an intermediary unit between society and the government. The 
quality of this relationship (society – political party – government) has an impact on the 
democratic development of a country in general. A political party needs financial 
sources to be stable and productive in this process, and to fulfil its core functions. A 
lack of financing is the main consequence when a political party decides to support or 
prioritise some private interests instead of public ones in exchange for financial 
benefits. That is why it is critical to have the same financing rules for every political 
party. They also provide equal access to financial sources and limit an influence of third 
parties on a political party and its decision-making that affects the electoral system and 
the whole country in the end. This chapter is devoted to the basic concepts and 
principles of the political party financing regime. It explains main elements of the 
political party financing regime, interrelations among them and what kind of relations it 
has with public trust in political parties. The second subchapter explains the relationship 
between financing regime of a political party and public trust in a political party.  
 
 
1.1 Political parties financing regimes  
 
A ruling-party has access to funding in different political systems. But when it is about 
political parties in opposition or new and smaller political parties that used to have 
limited access to financial sources, the rules for fair competition are needed. Max 
Weber conducted first research about party finance regimes at the beginning of 20th 
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century: “Party funding is one of the least transparent areas of party activity despite 
being one of the most significant” (Butler, 2010: 138). A legal framework of political 
financing consists of different regulatory elements that conduct a political financing 
mechanism in a country. Krasner described this mechanism in 1983 as “sets of implicit 
or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which 
actors' expectations converge” (Koß, 2010: 15). On the basis of this definition, Colomer 
(1996) introduced the term ‘institutional regime’. But Kaiser (1998) argued that 
“institutional regimes are not equivalent to political systems” and converted this term 
into the term ‘party funding regime’ (Koß, 2010: 16).  
Political financing regime has in its core legitimate sources of income and 
legitimate areas of spending, reporting and public disclosure of political activity (Koß, 
2010: 15), and access to free media resources and sanctions for the violations of 
political funding norms. According to Ingrid van Biezen (2003), it should be “a healthy 
mix of different sources of income, including both private and public funding” together 
with some imposed limitations on private donations and “condition that the accounts of 
political parties are subject to external audit” (Biezen, 2003: 13). Additionally, the 
emphasis must be made on monitoring over political financing and sanctions in the case 
of violations. The OSCE/ODIHR recommendations also insist on fair criteria for the 
allocation of public financial support (VC, 2010, paragraph 160: 35). German scientists 
Weissenbach and Korte conducted research on party finance regimes of new 
democracies and countries in transition. They concluded that party financing regime has 
a direct impact on (1) the autonomy of a political party that means some independence 
“from private donors and the degree of corruption within it”; (2) political equality and 
competition between parties during elections; (3) organizational structure of a party and 
democracy inside of it (Weissenbach and Korte, 2010: 138-139). In general, party 
financing regime has an impact on the political development in a country and predicts 
its potential future.    
There is four following forms of funding of political parties: (1) public funding; 
(2) private funding; (3) indirect funding that means different forms of support of a 
political party; (4) illegal funding. Nevertheless, there is no only one pure form of 
financing; current praxis shows that the funding mechanism of a political party has a 
hybrid form (Weissenbach and Korte, 2010: 138).  
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Private funding has always been a central source of political financing. There are 
next types of private financing (1) membership fees and joining fees; (2) donations 
(gifts) made by natural persons; (3) loans provided by banks and other financial 
institutions; (4) funding in a form of income received from the activity of a party 
including (4.1) interests received on funds kept in the bank accounts; (4.2) operations 
with property of a party and (4.3) incomes earned from sales of party literature and 
newspapers, etc. In other words, private financing of a political party includes all legal 
sources that are allowed in a country excluding subsidies from the state budget. 
The most legitimate form of party funding is a financing in the form of 
membership fees and joining fees. It means that members make their contributions 
voluntary and have no direct demand to receive some services instead. They support a 
political party ideological line. Nevertheless, political parties that have a significant 
number of members take heed of their members’ views and priorities that may be 
reflected in policy making. Membership and joining contributions are considered a 
democratic form of participation and depend to some extent on electoral performance. 
They are not legality prohibited or even allowed by law. Political parties regulate the 
minimum contribution by themselves. Nevertheless, some states set up contribution 
rates according to earned incomes aiming to avoid illegal access to political decision 
making through third-parties. In the case when political party members enjoy tax reliefs, 
this form of financing may not be treated as pure private funding (Biezen, 2003: 17-19).  
 Private donations are the other crucial source of political financing. But it has 
risks of ties between money and private political interests. That is why it is the most 
regulated form of political financing. The main principle here is to avoid conflict of 
interests and any secret donations and to provide transparency. A private donation is 
also “a form of political participation. Thus, legislation should attempt to achieve a 
balance between encouraging modest contributions and limiting unduly large 
contributions” (VC, 2010, paragraph 159: 35). The amount of collected private 
donations usually depends on fundraising capabilities of party leaders. For example, it 
takes from two months to two years to collect funds for the election campaign. 
According to Ikstens’ research, leaders of different political parties approach private 
companies and top management who have at least expressed relatively similar 
ideological views aiming to involve them into political financing process. “The majority 
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of these leaders confirmed the assumption that sponsors seek certain “interests” from 
their investments in parties. Eight out of eleven respondents admitted that potential 
sponsors frequently put forward suggestions or even demand of political and/or 
economic character. However, party leaders stress their selectivity in accepting these 
demands” (Ikstens, 2008: 53-54). The research showed that only few party leaders claim 
that they did not give way to those demands; few party leaders confirmed “occasional” 
acceptance of such demands, and several party leaders confessed that they had to give 
up some ideological principles to receive financing (Ibid). Private donations have the 
biggest impact on the equality of political participation and competition, especially in 
developing countries. That is why law regulates the value of private donations 
according to earned incomes. Some states exercise one contribution limit per one 
natural person for membership fees, joining fees and private donations altogether. To be 
eligible for private donations, a person must possess some qualifications. For example, 
in some countries, only citizens may contribute to political parties while in others 
foreigners holding long-term resident permits are allowed to be a political donator 
(Biezen, 2003: 23). Any corporate and foreign donations the same as anonymous 
donations must be prohibited. Gifts are the other type of private donation.   
Such form of political financing as loans provided by different financial 
institutions is relatively new. There are many critics of this kind of financing because of 
some visible ties between money and political decision making. In the case when the 
law does not prohibit loans, it has to be a rule that political parties are allowed to take 
loans only on market conditions and have credit relations only with those credit 
institutions that are registered in a country. The other limitations may be installed on the 
loan’s value. For example, a loan may not be larger than one-quarter of public subsidy. 
A loan must be secured only by the property of a party.    
In democratic societies, incomes from party activity are seen as a classical form. 
Except for the above-mentioned types of party income, parties may run “recreation 
facilities, provide social security services, own travel agencies, sports teams, banks and 
housing projects” and other areas (Biezen, 2003: 19). The only restriction is that parties 
“should be able to utilise these proceeds for their campaigns and operations. While the 
use of such proceeds must respect disclosure and spending requirements, it should not 
be otherwise limited by relevant legislation” (VC, 2010, paragraph 167: 36). However, 
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in modern praxis, such activity may be accused of links to corruption and lobbying of 
interests aiming to gain financial benefits. This form of political financing is prohibited 
in many countries. Often this type of financing is controversial as a political party is a 
non-profitable or non-commercial organisation by national law.  
Public funding is introduced in the political financing regime as a regulatory and 
balancing element to private funding and as a tool of corruption prevention. An 
introduction of public funding usually generates public discussions “concerning the 
exploitation of the state by parties and politicians” (Roper, 2008: 2). There are cases 
when leading political parties insist on public funding introduction due to the economic 
crises and a shortage of relevant financial sources for the upcoming elections. 
Nevertheless, it provides fair political competition and independence from third parties 
interested in decision-making. In many cases, new and small political parties benefit 
from the public funding. The total amount of political funding may be defined as a share 
of the annual state budget (0.01%, 0.05%, etc.) or by a flat rate. In the case when it is a 
share of the state budget, a party may receive a subsidy proportionally to seats obtained 
during elections or some fixed amount for reaching the threshold. A minimum subsidy 
also may be foreseen for parties that do not reach a threshold requirement and do not 
receive any seat in the parliament.   
The mechanism of public funding consists not only of state subsidies that are 
granted in compliance with threshold requirements but also of bans and limitations on 
private funding, party’s expenditures including pre-election period, an introduction of 
obligatory financial reporting, sanctions and existence of the oversight institutions. An 
oversight institution receives a pivotal role in the system. It should be composed of 
independent members and have all means for exercising monitoring functions (Biezen, 
2003: 13).  
Additionally to direct subsidies, political parties may receive indirect funding that 
is free access to media, tax privileges and other forms of state support.   However, the 
level of state funding should not make political parties dependent on it. It is one of the 
fundamental principles of political financing. Dependence on public funding will lead to 
a weakening of relations between a political party and its electorate (Biezen, 2003: 47).  
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As we see, political party financing is a system of checks and balances. 
Dependence as on private funding the same as on public leads to weakening of 
relationships with party's electorate. Biezen (2003) makes an emphasis on the system of 
matching funds that is used in Germany. In this system, political parties receive public 
subsidies proportionally to the amount of raised private donations (0.38 euro of public 
subsidy per each one euro private funds) (Biesen, 2003: 50). As we see, the idea of 
checks and balances is that a state must control the amount of political funding from the 
state budget. All these need a well developed legal framework. It does not mean that too 
many restrictions are good for a political financing regime. 
 
 
1.2 Trust in political parties 
 
In order to build a democratic state, politicians and civil society should cooperate.  In 
order to cooperate, some level of trust is needed. Many social science researchers have 
studied the meaning of trust as a term and find this category quite often confusing, 
complex or elusive. In general, the definition of trust is mostly defined (1) in terms of 
expectations (that reflect its future orientation) or beliefs (that show a potential 
influence of the other parties to the outcome); (2) as a behaviour; (3) in terms of feeling 
of being secure (“emotional security”) or confident in the trusted party (McKnight, 
Chervany, 1996: 8). But still, the concept of trust is considered very breadth. Even 
though demand for trust is growing (McKnight, Chervany, 2000: 827). But trust is very 
vulnerable in case of any risk or uncertainties that may cause effects weather on 
expectations or a behaviour and a feeling of security. Hence, a risk is one of the factors 
that define the quality of trust as it changes the perception and attitude to trust. And vice 
versa, trust is especially needed in situations when any risk arises (Mayer, Davis, 
Schoorman, 1995: 711). Thereof, the risk may be used to test the trust and its outcomes.  
Trust is very critical to young democracies. It enables governments to define their 
risks and enhances them to work more effectively (Mishler, Rose, 2001: 30-31). To test 
trust-risk relations, there is a model of trust that focuses on relations between two sides: 
a trusting party (trustor) and a party to be trusted (trustee) (Mayer, Davis, Schoorman, 
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1995: 711; Coleman, 1990: 96). Both actors have some purpose when they establish 
relations. There are only two choices: to keep the trust or to break the trust (Coleman, 
1990: 96). Hence, trust means here “an expression of confidence between the parties in 
an exchange of some kind-confidence that they will not be harmed or put at risk by the 
actions of the other party …”  (Jones and George, 1998: 531). The analysis of these 
relations shows that trust does not mean that trustee has to take all risks; it is only about 
trustee’s willingness to take some defined risks (Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman, 1995: 
712).  Coleman argues that a trustee may be interested in making some actions to create 
trust in the relations with a trustor. Hence, the analysis of desired outcomes of trust may 
lead to the understanding of how to manage the risks or how to behave to achieve 
specific goals or how to handle the trust to avoid some potential risks.  
Trust is a critical component in politics. With the help of expression of shared 
views and values, trust contributes to relation building between politicians and their 
electorate (Jones and George, 1998: 532). Schmitter and Karl prove these relationships 
through the definition of a democratic state. A democratic state is characterised by “a 
system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public 
realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their 
elected representatives (Schmitter and Karl, 1991: 76). It is possible to conclude that 
trust is an essential element for the political system. The example of relations between a 
trustee and a trustor explains the behaviour of a political party trying to create stronger 
relationships with potential voters during election campaigns. The leadership of a 
political party works at the building of trust with voters by providing its program that 
shows how this specific political party will deal with the challenges (risks). A political 
party needs trust to come to power; its electorate needs a political party because of 
(some) shared views and values, to become their ‘voice’ and represent them in the 
government. John Dunn warns of to distinguish between “trust in the good intentions of 
more or less professional politicians and trust in their functional capacities. Trust in 
either might often be an agreeable start” (Dunn, 2000: 89-90). But only real and 
practical functions are preferred to be trusted. Strengthening this argument, it is worth to 
take into account findings of Giffin who looks at trust through the prism of 
interpersonal relations (interpersonal trust) during communication. By Giffin, 
interpersonal trust is “based upon a listener’s perceptions of a speaker’s expertness, 
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reliability, intentions, activeness, personal attractiveness, and the majority opinion of 
the listener’s associates” (Giffin, 1967: 104). Here we see that communication plays a 
significant role in the political processes. It also explains why different famous artists, 
actors and other famous persons are invited to become a member of a political party and 
take an active part during election campaigns. Having some auditorium, it is much 
easier to get an attention of regular citizens and popularise views of a political party. 
Consequently, making an assumption by Coleman, a voter has to be rational while 
giving his vote to the right by his opinion political party.    
The organisation of free and fair elections the same as the active participation of 
citizens in these elections are among main elements of democratic development in a 
country. It is expected that elected representatives will provide the protection of human 
rights in a country and will participate in the development of laws that will be applied to 
all citizens respectively. Historically it has always been tensions and conflicts among 
political parties, thus their legitimacy and trust in them. Rosanvallon (2008) proves that 
legitimacy and trust are two political attributes that influence voting results 
(Rosanvalon, 2008: 3). Simmel (1999) made a hypothesis that trust is “a middle position 
between knowledge and ignorance of others” (Simmel, 1999: 315). Thus, only those 
party who received the highest support (meet a threshold requirements) should be taken 
into consideration. The logic here is next: as long as political parties represent their 
voter in the government and hence are legitimised, they should be financed by funds of 
these voters (electorate). Such funding is in the form of taxes paid to a state budget 
(public funding) or small personal donations (private funding). However public funding 
is available to a political party in case it meets a threshold requirement. On the basis of 
trust influencing an outcome of a political party, Rosanvallon defines trust by the 
assumption of Simmel’s thoughts1 that “trust is … a hypothesis about future behaviour” 
(Rosanvallon, 2008: 4). Hence, from one side we have political parties that operate in 
the particular legislative environment; but their conduct depends on political financing 
                                                 
1 Simmel, G. (1999). Sociologie: Études sur les formes de la socialisation (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1999), pp. 355–356:  “Certain enough to furnish the basis of practical action, 
trust is also an intermediate state between knowledge and ignorance of others. A person who knows 
everything has no need of trust. One who knows nothing cannot reasonably bestow his trust.” 
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regime; from the other hand, it depends on the level of trust in them and its behavioural 
tendency (see Figure 1.1). 
 
Figure 1.1 Ties between financing regime and public trust in a political party 
 
According to Zanini (2008), the behavioural risk is the most important in trust 
relations (Zanini, 2008: 23-24). The very first author who suggested the role of time in 
trust relations was Coleman (1990): “… one way in which the transactions that make up 
social action differ from those of the classical model of a perfect market lies in the role 
of time” (Coleman, 1990: 91). Zanini interprets ‘the role of time’ as time gaps.  If public 
trust connects legitimacy through its expansion that “continues into the future” 
(Rosanvallon, 2008: 3), that is behaviour, then it is possible to explain by using the time 
gaps why trust in the political party changes in the future.  
 It is possible to assume that violation of norms of political financing regime leads 
to shifts in the level of public trust (that is the future behaviour of trust). By this logic, 
trust is seen as an element of the political system. For this research, it is important to 
define trust as an institutional economiser that ties to the framework of political 
financing. Also, it is possible to claim that public funding regime creates a more 
transparent playing field, which over time builds a certain amount of trust in political 
parties. 
 
Legislative environment 
Conduct of a 
political party 
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CHAPTER 2. METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter presents a methodological approach to political financing regime and its 
links to public trust in political parties in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in order to test a 
hypothesis of the thesis. The subchapter about operationalization of data explains case 
study selections for the analysis, data used for the analysis and limitation of the study.   
 
 
2.1 Research hypothesis   
  
The aim of the research is to learn financing systems of political parties in Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania, to define their similarities and differences, and to test a 
relationship between an introduction of public funding and public trust for in political 
parties every chosen country in the moment of public funding introduction and during 
next parliamentary elections. 
The main hypothesis of the research is: public funding of political parties 
generates a higher level of trust in political parties. 
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2.2 Operationalization of data 
 
Public funding is an independent variable is this thesis.  
Public trust in political parties is a dependent variable as by the hypothesis the 
level (some level) of public trust in political parties depends on the introduction of 
public funding. Consequently, a level of public trust in political parties must shift 
(increase) during next parliamentary elections.   
The research design of the thesis is a few-N comparative study (three Baltic 
countries - Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania). 
The empirical chapter of this thesis is a comparative analysis of the relationship 
between political parties financing regimes and public trust in political parties in the 
Baltic States: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. All three states went through the nearly 
same historical formation of the political system: occupation by Soviets, restoration of 
independence in 1991, joining the European Union in 2004, though the implementation 
of all recommendation of the EU to built stable political systems in each country. If to 
look precisely to political party financing regime, Estonia was the first country that 
started to develop a more extensive system of state funding for political parties. Public 
funding is available for those parties that did not reach a threshold during last 
parliamentary elections. Estonia has slightly higher levels of public trust in political 
parties, although the absolute level is still relatively low. Latvian case is opposite to 
Estonian. State funding was introduced only in 2011 and came into effect only in 2014. 
Public trust in political parties is the lowest not only among the Baltic States but in the 
European Union. Lithuanian case is going to be between Estonian and Latvian.  
These three case studies serve as substantively interesting cases since they 
represent different levels of the proper state funding of political parties and public trust 
in political parties that we are looking at. Therefore we can test the connection between 
them better.  
 In the practical part, it is needed to define which factors and conditions have 
influenced the establishment of public funding of political parties in each country. On 
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the next stage, it will be done a comparative analysis of the system of public financing 
of political parties in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania according to their main financing 
laws. The aim of this analysis is to define differences in the legislation of given 
countries and to understand their nature. Also, it is needed to make a comparative 
analysis of national legislation on private financing of political parties in Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania. The aim of the analysis is to define the mechanism of such 
financing and the possibilities of violation of political parties’ financing norms. 
Preliminary analysis shows that very often private funding of political parties is used as 
a distortion of political party financing mechanism. That is why many democratic 
countries prefer public financing only.       
The dependent variable of the research (public trust in political parties) will be 
described and measured in the second part of the empirical chapter. Different studies 
propose to measure trust in political parties using trust index. By the methodology of the 
European Social Survey and the World Value Survey, trust index is calculated as the 
mean of three trust scores: (1) trust in the parliament; (2) trust in politicians, and          
(3) trust in political parties.  Each variable is measured by a five-level scale: great deal; 
quite a lot; not very much; none at all; cannot answer. These variables are highly 
correlated with each other and thus convey essentially the same information. 
Nevertheless, public trust in political parties will be analysed separately in this thesis 
but by the same scale and methodology.  
This analysis will be used to compare the level of trust in political parties in 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The analysis will show: 
 To which extent public funding regime differ in selected countries; 
 How reached the balance between public and private funding in selected 
countries; 
 How an introduction of public funding influences public trust in political 
parties. In the case when there is no influence, it will be given an explanation 
what the reasons are. 
It will be defined the condition of political financing regime in selected countries, 
the level of public trust in political parties and consequences of this relationship. 
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Data sources for political financing regime. National legislation is a primary 
source for the comparative analysis in all three case studies. The other data source on 
political finance regulation is provided by the International Institute for Democracy and 
Electoral Assistance (IDEA) that conducts a research of political financing since 2003. 
IDEA database covers approximately 180 countries including Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania.        
 Data sources for trust in political parties. The data of the World Value Survey 
(WVS) is the primary data source for analysis. The WVS conduct face-to-face or phone 
interviews with respondents who are between the ages of 18 and 85. The minimum 
sample size is 1200 conducted interviews. Each new research is conducted as a wave. 
Each wave has a specific number of questions. Each question has a number. In different 
waves, the same question is coded by various number (WVS, 2017).  
Trust in political parties is coded as a variable “Confidence: Political Parties” in 
the WVS.       
Question wording 
I am going to name a number of organisations. For each one, could you tell me 
how much confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of 
confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?  
Political parties.  
 
 
2.3 Research limitations  
 
In this research political parties are counted as legitimate formations as they are 
formed by the will of a group of citizens; they behave on behalf of the different mass of 
citizens, who supporting given party make it legitimate as well. Scientists look at 
political systems first of all through the prism of distrust (see Figure 2.1). 
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        Legitimacy                                                     Distrust    /    Trust       
                                     Political System 
 
Figure 2.1 Place of trust in the political system 
 
Coleman introduces distrust as a lack of trust by dividing the actions between the 
trustor and trustee “into two parts: the promise and the delivery. The delivery is partially 
but not wholly contingent on the promise” (Coleman, 1990: 750). Hence, distrust is the 
key element in the relations between a political party and a voter because a voter is not 
confident if a promise of a political party that is in the form of its program will be 
delivered in the form of real actions.          
There are two primary forms of the expression of distrust: liberal and democratic 
(by Montesquieu). Only these two theories are used for measurement.   
Trust is seen as an institutional economiser in this thesis.    
Comparative analysis of legislation on political parties financing system will be 
made basing not on similarities, but on differences that exist in Estonian, Latvian and 
Lithuanian political parties laws.    
The time frame of the analysis is described in Table 2.1: 
 
Table 2.1 The time frame of the analysis 
Country 
Year of introduction                   
of public financing of 
political parties 
Trust in political parties:          
in the year of 
public funding 
introduction 
in the year of the 
next elections after 
the introduction of 
public financing 
Estonia 1992 1991 - 1994 1996 
Lithuania  1999 1999 – 2000 2004 
Latvia 2011 2011 2015 – 2016 
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A time frame for each chosen country is different because of the different year of 
public funding introduction. Respectively, trust in political parties is tested in a year of 
public funding introduction and a year of the election next to public funding 
introduction.   
As we see from Table 2.1, trust in political parties in Estonia is estimated for the 
period 1991 – 1994 and in Lithuania for 1999 – 2000. It is because WVS conducts a 
research (a wave) for a four-year period of time. In the case of Latvia, there is no 
available data in the WVS as during the 1990s the only research was conducted for 
Latvia during the Wave 3. As we look at the level of trust in a year when public funding 
was introduced, this data is not relevant. No new data on trust in political parties is 
available for Latvia.    
In the case of Lithuania, the WVS has no data for the period 2000 – 2004, but 
there is data for the period 2005 - 2009. As 2005 was the year after 2004 parliamentary 
elections, this data was taken for the analysis.  
As different agencies use a different methodology for data collection, and its 
interpretation, analytical reports of Eurobarometer were used only to see the tendency of 
trust in political parties (declining or increasing), but not to compare data with WVS. 
 
24 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
This chapter provides a comparative analysis of political party financing in three Baltic 
States: Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Before turning to the analysis, it is useful to look 
at the definition of a political party in the national legislation of each country. 
According to §1 of the Estonian Political Party Act (passed 11.05.1994, with the 
latest amendment in force 01.07.2014), “a political party is a voluntary political 
association of Estonian citizens, which has been registered pursuant to the procedure 
provided for in this Act and the objective of which is to express the political interests of 
its members and supporters and to exercise state and local government authority” (Eesti 
Vabariigi  Riigikogu, 2014). A political party is a non-profit organisation by The Non-
profit Associations Act.  
Section 2 of Chapter 1 of the Law On Political Party (passed in 2006, with the 
latest amendment in force 2011) defines a party as “an organisation that is established in 
order to perform political activities, to participate in election campaigns, to nominate 
candidates for deputy positions, to participate in the work of the Saeima, local 
government councils (parish councils) or the European Parliament, to implement the 
party programme with the intermediation of deputies, as well as to be involved in the 
establishment of public administrative bodies” (Latvijas Republikas Saeima, 2011). 
Also, a political party can be a member of one registered party alliance in Latvia. 
Article 2 of Chapter 1 of the Law On Political Parties of the Republic of Lithuania 
(passed 25.09.1990, with the latest amendment by 2014) states that “a political party 
shall be a public legal person who has its own name, has been established pursuant to 
this Law, and whose purpose is to meet political interests of its members, to assist in 
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expressing the political will of the citizens of the Republic of Lithuania, in seeking to 
implement state power and the right to self-government” (Lietuvos Respublikos Seimas, 
2014).  
To sum up, Estonian legislation defines a political party as a non-profitable 
association. It provides a clear understanding of its limited financial operations. Latvian 
definition is not so precise as Estonian while there is no clear description of what 
political activities are; section 7 defines only public activities of a party. Furthermore, it 
is pointed out (section 8 of LPP(lv)) that a party may have economic activity, but with 
later remark “which do not have the nature or purpose of profit making” (Latvijas 
Republikas Saeima, 2011). A political party definition in Lithuanian law is more 
neutral. But in the case of activities of a political party, the LPP(lt) directly relies on the 
Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania and the Law on Funding of Political Parties and 
Political Campaigns and Control of Funding (LFPP(lt)).       
According to the recommendations of the VC on the financing of political parties, 
all political parties may seek for public and private sources of funding. Public financing 
must be available to each political party that has seats in the parliament on a periodic 
basis and by some specific criteria. Additionally, an effective control should be 
guaranteed by a specific public organisation. Membership fees and private financial 
donations from citizens of a state are main recommended sources of private financing 
(VC, 2001: 2-4). The other sources such as candidate’s personal resources and loans are 
described in Chapter XII of the Guidelines on Political Party Regulation adopted by the 
Venice Commission at its 84th Plenary Session (VC, 2010: 35-46).  
Next three subchapters are devoted to the comparative analysis of political 
financing regime in the Baltic States.  The emphasis in the analysis is made on 
differences of each country’s regime while all three countries followed 
recommendations of the VC while establishing public funding. The last subchapter is 
devoted to public trust in political parties.  
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3.1. Public funding of political parties in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania 
 
Public funding of political parties was introduced in Estonia in the first version of 
the “Political Parties Act” (PPA) in 1994 and has been in effect since 1996. Newly 
adopted PPA defined the minimum number of members for a political party that must 
have at least 1000 members2 and introduced a system of states subsidies. Allocations 
from the state budget of Estonia were guaranteed only to those political parties that met 
a threshold requirement in proportion to obtained sits in the Riigikogu. Not only newly 
formed but also old parties favoured public funding, that in the second half of the 1990s 
grew up annually till 1,25 million euro (Pettai, 2009: 80). After the parliamentary 
elections of 1995, political parties distributed first state subsidy of 5 million Estonian 
kroons (EUR 319,693) among five parties and “two small parties that made up two 
electoral alliances” (Pettai, 2017: 7). This money was enough to reduce the dependence 
of political parties on private donations in Estonia. But significant regulation on private 
donations was made only in 2003 when it was introduced bans on private donations to 
political parties from the industry. Some scholars argue that only already existing 
political parties could thoroughly enjoy ‘privileges’ of state subsidies and 
“institutionalize their relations with their members and voters” (Pettai, 2009: 80). Newly 
created parties became limited in private support and would receive state funding later, 
but in the case of meeting the threshold requirements. The introduction of the threshold 
influenced the decrease in a number of parties entering the parliament3 (Sikk, Kangur, 
2008: 63). One of the reasons was that during the 1990s approx. ten percent of Estonian 
citizens gave their votes for political parties that could not cross the threshold, while 
after 2000 this number is less than five percent (Pettai, 2008: 80). It means that Estonian 
                                                 
2 The minimum number of members of a political party is 200 in Latvia (as of 1992) and 2000 in 
Lithuania (400 as of 1992, 1000 as of 2004 and 2000 as of 2015). 
3 The average number of political parties entering Riigikogu was 5.7 during 1992 – 2007 (15 
years), but the average of the effective number of electoral parties entering Riigikogu equaled 6,4 for the 
same period (Pettai, 2008: 79). But in 1992 separately, the effective number of political parties entering 
Riigikogu was 5.9 while in 2007 this number was 4.4 (Sikk, Kangr, 2008: 63).     
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voters become more rational. Also, it seems that they are starting to believe more in 
older parties then in newly formed ones. 
Paragraph 121 of Chapter 21 of the updated PPA (entry into force 01.04.2011) sets 
up main rules of funding of political parties’ activity in Estonia. The Law defines 
subsidies from the state budget as the primary source of a political party in Estonia 
(Eesti Vabariigi  Riigikogu, 2011). But there are restrictions. Allocations from the state 
budget are available only to a political party; not for a single candidate or coalition. A 
political party must obtain a minimum threshold requirement of five percent to be 
eligible for state funding. Allocation is paid from Estonian state budget proportionally 
to the number of seats obtained in the election on a monthly basis as one-twelfth of the 
annual amount of the public subsidy (PPA, Chapter 21, §127 (1)). Before 2003, only 
parliamentary parties could receive public funding. In 2003 this norm was changed 
aiming to support small parties that did not obtain a threshold requirement of five 
percent. A party that received one percent of votes during parliamentary elections was 
granted 9 587 euro of annual state funding. A party that received four percent of votes 
received 15 978 euro per year. A party that received five and more percents received 
state funding proportionally to the seats in the Riigikogu (Transparency International 
Tallinn, 2012: 4). As of 2014, this norm is changed according to the amendment RT I, 
05.02.2014, 1 that entered into force as of the commencement of the term of the 
Riigikogu office of the XIII composition on 01.04.2014.  
Hence, only those political parties are eligible for state funding that obtained no 
less than two percent of votes during parliamentary elections. The level gradation of 
received votes by political parties that do not meet threshold requirement is also more 
precise: (1) 2% but less than 3%; (2) 3% but less than 4% and (3) 4% but less than 5%. 
A political party will receive an annual allocation of 30000 euro, 60 000 euro and 100 
000 euro respectively according to the level of obtained votes (PPA, Chapter 21, §127 
(2)). As we see, newly updated legislation introduces a twice higher threshold for 
getting states subsidies by political parties that received less than 5% of votes during 
last elections (2% instead of 1%). The minimum allocation is more than three times 
higher (30 000 euro instead of 9 587 euro), and the maximum amount of the subsidy 
from the Estonian budget is more than six times higher (100 000 euro instead of 15 978 
euro).  
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Analytics from Transparency International Estonia and Bertelmann Stiftung claim 
that amendments made to PPA in section §127 “Allocations from state budget” in 2014 
significantly improved the existing system of party financing in Estonia. Nevertheless, 
the system of party funding remains not balanced; there is high inequality in public 
funding of parliamentary and non-parliamentary parties (Transparency International 
Estonia, 2014: 4; Bertelmann Stiftung, 2016: 2). In 2016, Estonian Reform Party 
received 1 697 726 euro for 30 obtained in the Riigikogu sits, Estonian Centre Party 
received 1 446 953 euro for 27 seats, Social Democratic Party received 803 863 euro for 
15 seats, Pro Patria and the Res Publica Union received 750 272 euro for 14 seats, Free 
Party received 428 727 euro for 8 seats and Conservative People’s Party received 375 
136 euro for 7 obtained in the Parliament seats. In total, six governmental parties in 
Estonia received 5 412678 euro in 2016, in average annually 53 590.87 euro for one 
obtained seat in the Riigikogu4, whereas in 1996 this amount was equalled 319558 euro 
or 3164 euro for one obtained seat (Riigikogu Kantselei, 2016: 1). Allocations from the 
Estonian state budget for the non-governmental parties were not foreseen in 2016 as any 
other party (except those six political parties who obtained 5% threshold) didn’t receive 
even one percent of votes during elections in 2015. For the period of twenty years (1996 
– 2016), it was allocated more than 71 million euro of public funds to political parties in 
Estonia5.     
Lithuania had a number of legislative acts that regulated election financing during 
the 1990s. Many different modifications of political financing were experienced. Hence, 
it was a hot debate among political parties whether there was a need for the introduction 
of public funding. But economic crises and lack of available resources for the upcoming 
parliamentary elections of 2000 made an effect to the process and influenced common 
understanding that state subsidies might strengthen political parties and promote the 
transparency of a party financing. As a result, public funding of political parties was 
introduced in 1999 in Lithuania when the “Law of the Funding of Political Parties and  
                                                 
4 In 1990s, the total budget of public funding of political parties had a slow increase. In 2004 it 
was tripled (from 1.28 million euro in 2003 to 3.83 million euro in 2004). The next rise took place in 
2008 to 5.75 million euro. The yearly amount of public funding is stable since 2010 (by the data of 
Riigikogu Kantselei, 2016: 1).   
5 Calculates by the data of Eesti Vabariigi  Riigikogu Kantselei (2016). 
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Political Organizations” (LFPP(lt)) was enacted. Thus, crises united Lithuanian political 
elites around the introduction of public funding to political parties (Unikaite, 2008: 33-
34). 
According to the “Law on Elections to the Seimas” (1994), it was set up the four 
percent threshold of obtained during election votes to enter Lithuanian Parliament. A 
special regulation was implemented for political organisations that represented ethnic 
minorities. These parties could enter the Seimas with 2 percent threshold. In 1996, the 
threshold requirements were changed. It was increased to 5 percent to a single political 
party. A party coalition could come to the Parliament having at least 7 percent of votes, 
while the special threshold for minorities was abolished (Unikaite, 2008: 31). Unikaite 
claims that the threshold retirements were changed under the efforts of the Lithuanian 
Democratic Labour Party (LDLP), the Homeland Union Lithuanian Conservatives 
(HULC) and the Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party (LChDP) that were the 
strongest parties in Lithuanian Parliament aiming to restrict any competition. 
Nevertheless, the introduction of the coalition threshold gave hope for smaller parties to 
enter the Seimas (Ibid).              
Currently, public funding of a political party in Lithuania is organised according 
to the “Law on Financing and Financial Control of Political Parties and Political 
Campaigns” (Article 14), adopted in 2004. By the law (Chapter 2, Article 7), 
membership fees are considered to be the primary source of political financing in 
Lithuania. State subsidies are the secondary funding source of a political party (Lietuvos 
Respublikos Seimas, 2014). Allocations from the state budget in Lithuania are available 
only for those political parties that meet all requirements of the previously mentioned 
law (Article 15 “The Procedure for Calculating the Size of, as well as for Distributing 
and Paying, State Budget Appropriations for Funding the Activities of Political Parties”, 
Clause 1): “1. Political parties that are registered with the Register of Legal Entities in 
accordance with the procedure laid down by law and meet the requirements established 
by law regarding the number of members of a political party, and against which no 
restructuring or liquidation procedure has been instituted, shall be entitled to state 
budget appropriations for funding the activities of political parties” (Lietuvos 
Respublikos Seimas, 2011). Additionally to the mentioned requirement, a political party 
must obtain at least three percent of votes during elections “to the Seimas, municipal 
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councils, and the European Parliament according to the results of which these state 
budget appropriations are distributed” (Ibid). A total sum of state subsidies for the 
financing of political parties is fixed in a state budget (Article 14, Clause 2). Its annual 
amount may not exceed 0.1% of the annual state budget of Lithuania (Unikaite, 2008: 
34).  Also, a political party is obligated to notify the Central Electoral Commission on 
the number of its members by 1 April annually. In the case of violation of LFPP(lt), the 
CEC will stop public funding of a political party for the period of two years starting 
from the date when such decision will be accepted (Article 14, Clauses 3-5) (Lietuvos 
Respublikos Seimas, 2014).      
Lithuanian legislation provides specific procedure according to which allocations 
from the state budget are distributed to political parties. The sum of state subsidy is 
calculated by multiplication of a six-month financial coefficient (that is an amount of 
funds for one vote for a six month period) and the number of obtained votes by the 
specific candidate of a political party during elections (Article 15, clause 4). The Central 
Electoral Commission defines the amount of allocation and transfers it to the account of 
a political party twice a year by 15 April and 15 November (Article 15, Clause 5).    
State subsidies for financing the activity of political parties in Lithuania were 
insignificant at the beginning of the 2000s. Because of the lack of available financial 
sources, parliamentary parties started to promote public funding system. The total share 
of state subsidies for political parties was growing up in the state budget. The biggest 
share of state subsidies was distributed among the three largest parties (Lithuanian 
Social Democratic Party - LSDP, the New Union / Social Liberal – NU/SL, and 
Lithuanian Liberal Union – LLU). In 2005, they received additionally a compensation 
of the costs incurred during the electoral campaign. For the period of 6 years (2000 – 
2006), the annual amount of state funding increased from 268104 euro (980000 Lt6) in 
2000 to 1.7 million euro in 2004 (6 million Lt) and 4.3 million euro (15 million Lt) at 
the end of 2006 for the year of 2007. In 2015 and 2016, allocations from the state 
budget were 5.5 million each year.  For the period of sixteen years (2000 – 2016), it was 
                                                 
6 According to the European Central Bank, the average exchange rate was 1 Euro = 3.6553 LTL in 
2000 and 3.4528 LTL in 2004. As of February 2002, the exchange rate of the Lithuanian lit is fixed to 
Euro because of accession of Lithuania to the EU (1 Euro = 3.4528 LTL).   
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granted approx. 51 million euro to political parties from the state budget (Unikaite, 
2008: 35-37; The Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Lithuania, 20177).          
At the beginning of 2000, the VC presented detailed recommendations regarding 
funding of political parties. These recommendations were developed in late 1990-x and 
adopted in 2001. The development of political financing regimes in Estonian and 
Lithuania was conducted partly in correspondence with these recommendations because 
of the future accession of the Baltic States to the EU in 2004. The regulatory framework 
of political party financing in Latvia has been developing differently than in Estonia and 
Lithuanian. Latvia was the poorest country among the Baltic countries and had a larger 
number of problematic issues to solve. In the tradition of the Baltic States, Latvia also 
adopted a law that regulated political financing in the country in the mid of 1990s 
(LFPP(lv), adopted in July 1995, the latest amendment made in 12.09.2013). But public 
funding of political parties wasn’t extensively discussed mostly because of two reasons: 
“lack of money in the state budget and the failure of parties to fulfil their educative and 
informative functions” (Ikstens, 2013: 11). The other reason was that bank loans 
became a primary source of political financing since 1998 until they were forbidden in 
2004. Finally, public funding of political parties was introduced in Latvia in 2010 and 
entered into force in 2011. Before the introduction of public funding, “Latvia has seen a 
high degree of electoral volatility and notable turnover of parties at the parliamentary 
level” (Ikstens, 2008: 59). As of 2012, those political parties that meet two percent of 
threshold requirement during parliamentary elections may get public funding in Latvia. 
An eligible political party could receive a public subsidy of 0.50 Lats per one vote. In 
2013 this norm was changed. An eligible political party receives annually 0.71 Euro per 
each vote obtained during last parliamentary elections (LFPP(lv), Section 71).  
Moreover, each political party that is eligible for public funding has to open a 
special bank account to make all transactions during the political campaign. A party has 
only 20 days to present information indicating its name, registration number and 
number of party members to Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau (KNAB) 
                                                 
7 The Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Lithuania provides full data about public 
funding of political parties since 2000 in national currency, lt. That is why all sums in the text are 
converted to euro (http://www.vrk.lt/).   
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that takes a decision whether to grant state subsidies to a party or not (LFPP(lv), Section 
72). This decision is made on the basis whether a political party during last four years:  
(1) violated the norm on pre-election expenses by more than ten percent;  
(2) did not indicate some incomes or expenditures, the total amount of which 
exceeded 100 minimum monthly salaries and was punished for it; and  
(3) had any coercive measures applied to a party and proved by the court 
(LFPP(lv), Section 73).                
Hence, it is easy to deduce that this system is very beneficial for big political 
parties rather than for small ones. Ikstens argues that such amount of public subsidies is 
not sufficient source for big political parties as it is enough only to cover daily expenses 
(Ikstens, 2013: 12). KNAB also admits that private funding is still the most important 
source of financing of political parties in Latvia. The Expert Group for Governance 
Improvement (established by the President of Latvia Andris Bērziņš) made a proposal 
to increase the level of public funding “in order to reduce the dependence of political 
parties on private donors significantly” (Latvijas Valsts Prezidents, 2014: 8). But only 
16.2% of the surveyed Latvian citizens support this proposal (Ibid).    
The design of the regulatory framework of public funding in the Baltic States has 
been changing since these countries declared the accession to the EU. In 2001, the 
Venice Commission adopted “Guidelines on political party regulation” that defined the 
main principles of public funding. The OSCE/ODIHR amended the document in 
October 2010. Public financing regimes in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania contain all 
main elements, but still, they have many differences that are presented in Table 3.1.      
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Table 3.1 Comparative analysis of political parties’ public financing                                                  
of the Baltic States according to their main financing Laws* 
Comparative 
indicators  
Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
Legislation basis  PPA LFPP (lv) LFPP (lt) 
1. Basis of public 
financing  
Regularly provided 
Regularly 
provided 
Regularly provided + 
financing by separate 
governmental  programs 
2. Eligibility 
criteria of public 
financing 
Representation in the 
election body – 
Riigikogu, 5% 
threshold. Funding 
proportionally to the 
obtained in the 
parliament seats.    
The share of votes 
in previous 
elections – more 
than 2% of votes. 
 
The share of votes in 
previous elections must be at 
least 3% of votes. 
3. Allocation 
calculation  
The equal amount 
provided to smaller 
parties, larger parties 
receive funding 
proportionally to votes 
and seats obtained in 
the election. 
Parties receive 
allocation by a 
flat rate of 0.71 
euro per each 
received vote. 
On the basis of the six-month 
coefficient per one vote:   
(1) An annual subsidy budget 
is divided into 2 parts and 
then by the number of all 
votes obtained by parties that 
have met a threshold 
requirement during election  
(it is a six-month coefficient 
per one vote);  
(2) An amount of subsidy is 
equal to the obtained in 
election votes multiplied by 
the six-month coefficient.    
4. Budget 
financing of 
parties which 
haven’t reached a 
threshold, per 
year 
Not available for 
parties that didn’t 
receive at least 2% of 
votes. 
Parties that receive at 
least: 
2% but less than 3% of 
the  votes will receive 
annually 30000 euro;  
3% but less than 4% of 
votes  - 60 000 euro; 
4% but less than 5% of 
the votes – 100 000 
euro.  
In the case of a merger 
of political parties, 
allocations are 
summed up. In the 
case of division of 
political party, the 
allocation is divided 
on the basis of the  
Not available for 
parties that didn’t 
receive at least 
2% of votes. 
 
The threshold to 
enter Parliament 
is 5% for a single 
party or 
association of 
parties.  
Parties that didn’t 
enter the 
Parliament, but 
received at least 
2% and less than 
5% will receive 
public funding 
under the same 
conditions as 
parliamentary 
parties (by flat  
Not available for parties that 
obtained less than 3% of 
votes. 
 
The threshold to enter 
Parliament is 5% for a single 
party and 7% for a coalition. 
Parties that didn’t enter the 
Parliament but obtained at 
least 3% of votes receive an 
allocation from the budget 
under the same conditions as 
parliamentary parties: by the 
six-month coefficient per one 
vote. 
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Comparative 
indicators  
Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
 
agreement of division. rate 0.71 Euro per 
one vote).    
Parties that surpass 
the 2% threshold are 
eligible to receive 
back the required 
1,400-euros deposit 
 
5. Period of 
public financing 
Each year until the month 
of the elections results. 
For 4 years; from the 
next calendar year 
after the Saeima 
elections.   
Each year  
6. Payment 
performance of 
public financing 
One-twelfth of the annual 
amount – by the fifth date 
of each month  
Four times a year – 
until 15 January, 15 
April, 15 July and 15 
October 
One time every six 
months - not later than 
by 15 April and 15 
November of each year 
7. Amount of 
annual 
allocation  from 
the state budget 
to political 
parties 
Annual subsidies to 
political parties are 
determined in the State 
budget (0,05%?). But the 
law does not provide any 
details how this amount is 
defined.  
- 
The annual share of 
allocation in the annual 
state budget is 0,1%. 
 
*Table 3.1 is built on the basis of PPA, LFPP(lv), LFPP(lt) and political finance data of IDEA. 
 
As we see, Table 1 indicates more loyal public financing procedure in Estonia 
than in Latvia and Lithuania. Estonian parties that have not reached a threshold to enter 
the parliament, but obtained more than two percent of votes, receive allocations from 
the budget. Nevertheless, the legislation framework in Lithuania and Latvia is more 
equitable to small and newly formed parties. These parties must obtain at least two 
percent of votes to receive public funding under the same conditions as leading parties. 
Latvian public financing procedure seems to be more capitalistic as Latvian parties 
receive funding by a flat rate calculation. A flat rate basis means the stable amount of 
money per each obtained during election vote (0.71 Euro per vote). Of cause, in this 
case, the leading party is getting more public funds than following ones.  
Moreover, a payment performance of subsidies is entirely different in the Baltic 
States. In Estonia, such payments are made monthly, in Latvia – quarterly, and in 
Lithuania – twice a year. In Estonia, an amount of payment is minimised. It is possible 
to assume that it is harder to make any manipulations with one-twelfth than with one-
35 
 
fourth part of annual subsidy. Estonian legislation foresees that this amount is enough to 
cover current needs of a political party. A political party is allowed to use state 
subsidies only for the election campaign. Latvian subsidies that are calculated by a flat 
rate were introduced with the same idea. In this case, each party has to manage its 
public funds carefully, especially before elections with the aim to accumulate some 
financial resources in advance that will be used during elections campaign. In 
Lithuanian case, a party receives a six-month amount of public subsidy twice a year. 
Respectively, party top management can plan their expenditures much easily in a year 
of elections. But there is a bigger possibility of corrupt manipulations. Latvian case of 
payment performance seems to be the most optimal as it is paid quarterly. A political 
party receives enough money to cover current expenditures and to foresee some 
amounts in advance especially in a year of elections. 
Estonian PPA defines a period of public financing much more accurately – each 
year until the month of elections. Latvian legislation defines four years period between 
elections. In Lithuania, a period of public funding is “each year” (meaning from 
elections to elections). But Latvian and Lithuanian political party financing Laws can be 
controversial in the case of parliament dissolutions and early elections.    
To sum up, despite the introduction of public financing in all three Baltic States, 
Latvian and Lithuanian political parties claim that this funding is not enough to cover 
even daily needs. In the case of Estonia, there are proposals to cut public funding as 
parliamentary parties receive annually approximately one million euro per each party8. 
Despite allocations from the state budget constitute substantial portion in funds of 
political parties, private funding is still a primary source of political financing in 
Lithuania. Private funding represents even a bigger share in funds of Latvian political 
parties.   
 
 
                                                 
8 In May 2015, Free Party (Eesti Vabaerakond - EV) initiated a collective appeal to the 
Constitutional Commission to reduce public funding of political parties at least by half.  EKRE supports 
this idea to cut the amount of public funding of political parties while Estonian Reform Party and 
Estonian Centre Party that are the recipients of the biggest share of public funds state that public funding 
system is transparent and well organized. The Constitutional Commission rejected the appeal in 2016.  
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3.2. Private funding of political parties in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania  
 
Private funding is a traditional political party financing method. According to Chapter 
21 (§121) of PPA, a political party may receive private funding from the next sources in 
Estonia: membership fees established on the basis of the articles of association of the 
political party; donations; borrowing from credit institutions and transactions with the 
property of the political party (Eesti Vabariigi  Riigikogu, 2014). In the case of Latvia, a 
political party may receive financing from membership and joining fees; gifts 
(donations) from natural persons; income earned by the economic activity of a political 
party and the other not prohibited sources of funding (LFPP(lv), Section 2). Lithuanian 
legislation provides the longest list of political parties financing sources. It is 
membership fees that are initial and periodic; funds received from other activities such 
as publishing, distribution of printed materials and party symbols, organization of 
political and cultural events (such as lectures and exhibitions), etc.; loans provided by 
banks registered in Lithuania; interest on the funds kept in the bank accounts and tax 
relief that equals to one percent of the annual income tax paid by a Lithuanian resident 
who voluntarily allocates some funds for the political campaign. All these sources have 
to be permanent (LFPP(lt), Chapter 2, Article 7). As we see, in Estonia, the PPA defines 
only primary funding sources. But it doesn’t contain any information about income 
from the political party’s activity. A political party may only organise some operations 
with its property. As it was mentioned above, a political party in Estonia by definition is 
a non-profitable organisation. It means that a political party cannot earn any income or 
profit per se. However, in Latvia and Lithuania, a political party may be engaged in 
some economic activity aiming to receive additional funding. By the Latvian Law, any 
financial and economic activity of a political party/organisation should be transparent 
and presented publicly (LFPP(lv), Section 9). In the case of Lithuania, types of 
financing of political parties are too different and well classified.  
To sum up, legislators tried to describe all potential sources of financing of a 
political party in all three countries. Estonian legislation provides very strict definitions 
of these sources, while in Latvia and Lithuania there are variations with other sources. 
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In addition to it, Lithuanian law recognises sources of funding of political campaign 
separately from those that are used to cover operational needs of a political party. It is 
political party funds received from its sources of funding that are used for political 
campaign; donations made by natural persons during political campaign period; loans 
received during political campaign period from the credit institutions that are registered 
in Lithuania; and interests of the funds that are kept in the account of political campaign 
(LFPP(lt), Chapter 2, Article 7, paragraph 8). In the case of Estonia, it is allowed to use 
state budget allocations only for the political campaign. Latvian political parties are 
allowed to use state budget allocation for operational needs of a party and a political 
campaign. Table 3.2 contains information about the mechanism of private financing of 
political parties in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania according to the national legislation of 
each country. 
Table 3.2 Comparative analysis of political parties’ private financing                                    
in the Baltic States according to their main financing Laws* 
Comparative 
indicators  
Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
Legislation basis  PPA LFPP(lv) LFPP(lt) 
1. Membership fees 
and/or joining fees 
From natural persons 
(party members with 
the identification of 
their personality: who 
pays, the amount of 
payment and date of 
payment). Fees are 
established on the 
basis of the articles of 
association of the 
political party 
From natural persons. 
The total amount of 
membership fee, 
joining fee and 
donations (gifts) may 
not exceed 50 
minimum monthly 
salaries during one 
calendar year for one 
member 
 
From natural  persons 
who under the Law have 
the right to donate 
2. Donations 
From all Estonian 
citizens and persons 
who have long-term 
residence permit 
From all Latvian 
citizens and all persons 
who have a right to 
receive Aliens passport 
in Latvia 
From all citizens of 
Lithuania, permanent 
residents, stateless 
persons, private legal 
persons 
3. Indication of 
donation and donor 
The name and personal 
identification code of 
the donator and the 
amount and the date of 
accrual of the 
donation; procedure of 
donation should be 
published on a website 
of a party 
The given name, 
surname, personal 
identification number, 
and place of residence 
of the giver (donor). If 
donation exceeds one 
min monthly salary, all 
the data must be given 
to KNAB 
The names of all 
donating persons must 
be disclosed. A list of 
donors should be posted 
on the CEC website 
during ten working days 
after donation is made 
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Comparative 
indicators  
Estonia Latvia Lithuania 
4. Corporate 
donations 
Donations of any legal 
person are 
not allowed 
Donations of any 
legal person are 
not allowed 
Not allowed since 2011 
5. Anonymous 
donations  
Not allowed Not allowed Not allowed 
6. Any other 
donation 
Not allowed Not specified Not specified 
7. Other prohibited 
donations  
The Law gives a big 
range of prohibited 
donations that must be 
immediately returned 
to donator where it is 
possible within 30 
days; where it is not 
possible – resend it to 
the state budget. 
Anonymous or any 
prohibited donations 
must be transferred to 
the State budget 
within 5 days. 
Donations must 
belong to the donator. 
Third party donations 
are prohibited. 
Donations to a political 
party through third persons 
are forbidden. All 
prohibited donations must 
be returned to the donator 
within 5 working days 
from the day of the receipt 
of donation indicating the 
reason why donation may 
not be accepted. If it is not 
possible to return the 
donation to a donator, it 
must be transferred to the 
state budget within 10 
working days. 
8. Limitation of 
amount of donor 
contributions 
Cash donations - up to 
1200 euro per financial 
year; no limit for bank 
transfers.   
Up to 50 minimum 
salaries during one 
calendar yea/r  
Up to 20 average monthly 
salaries (that were 
previously declared). 
Donation may not exceed 
10 % of the annual income 
of the donator. 
9. Limitation of 
donor contribution 
over a time period 
Not specified  Not specified Not specified 
10. Loans 
Allowed (Ch.2 §122); 
by credit institutions, 
only on market 
conditions. Loan must 
be secured only by the 
property of a party 
Prohibited  
(Section 6 (5)) 
Allowed (Ch. 2, Art. 7, 
Par. 6); only by those 
banks that are registered in 
the Republic of Lithuania 
 
*Table 3.2 is built on the basis of PPA, LFPP(lv), LFPP(lt) and political finance data of IDEA. 
 
Membership fees are the primary private source of financing of political parties in 
the Baltic States. PPA defines membership fees as a funding source in Estonia that must 
be established by the articles of association of the political party (§121). Additionally, 
Latvia legislation foresees joining fees but does not provide any description of how 
these fees are set up. The total amount of joining and membership fees together with 
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donations and gifts may not exceed fifty minimum monthly salaries for one member of 
the political party within one calendar year (LFPP(lv), Section 3). However, if to look at 
the norm that a party has to notify the KNAB in the case when membership and joining 
fees together with donations exceed one minimum monthly salary for one member, the 
norm of the maximum of fifty minimum monthly wages is not justified9. It means that 
one member of a political party has a right to pay membership and joining fees plus 
donations and gifts at the maximum of 19 000 euro during 2017. A political party is 
obligated to inform the KNAB if a member pays or donates at least 380 euro within one 
year. The KNAB publishes this information on the own website. This information also 
should be included in the report of a party. In Lithuania, membership fees and procedure 
of its payment must be defined in the statute of a party. Such fees are periodic and/or 
initial. Initial fees are joining fees. The legislator also gives a possibility to political 
parties to set up other membership fees additionally to these two types of fees (LFPP(lt), 
Chapter 2, Article 7, paragraphs 4-5). However, there are no any limitations on the 
value of membership fees in Lithuania.                   
Donations are the other significant source of political funding in the Baltic States 
that have one standard feature: Donations are accepted only from natural persons. The 
term “donation” is “a financially assessable benefit, including a service, but not 
voluntary work, voluntarily given by a natural person” according to the PPA (PPA, 
Chapter 21 §123). In Latvian LFPP(lv), “donation” has an association with “gift” and 
“gratis benefit” (Section 2 (2)). Lithuanian legislation provides a more precise 
definition; it is “cash, movables or immovables, information, property rights, results of 
intellectual activities, other material and non-material values transferred” (LFPP(lt), 
Chapter 1, Article 2, paragraph 1). All collected financial funds should be kept in a 
current bank account of a political party. Corporate donations are not allowed in the 
Baltic States. In Lithuanian case, it was allowed until 2011. In all three countries, 
donators should be defined; their personal information must be publicly performed the 
same as an amount of the donation and a date when it was done. Estonian citizens and 
other persons who have a long-term residence permit in Estonia are allowed to make 
donations to political parties. In Latvia, not only citizens but all holders of Aliens 
                                                 
9 The minimum monthly salary in Latvia was 370 Euro in 2016. As of 01 January 2017, this 
amount is 380 Euro (Eurostat, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat, acceses on 20.03.2017).  
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passports are allowed to make donations. In Lithuania, the list of donators also contains 
stateless persons and legal persons. Hence, such mechanism provides more possibilities 
for private donations in Latvia and Lithuania. Estonian law is stricter in this case and 
prevents political parties from the influence of third sides (for example, foreign states 
funding). Researchers point out on “the ever-changing regime of party finance [that] 
reflects an evolution of methods Latvian parties use to compete in the election. Despite 
the numerous revisions of legislation, a fundamental aspect of party finance has 
remained stable – party continues to rely on private money” (Ikstens, 2013: 12). Latvian 
system is characterised by a stable dominance of large donations (Ibid: 13). As it was 
mentioned before, the total value of donations (or a combination of membership and 
joining fees together with gifts and donations) may not exceed the amount of 50 
minimum monthly salaries within one year by one natural person in Latvia10. On 
average, five leading parties collect approximately 90 percent of all donations in Latvia. 
Within a single election cycle, five leading parties collect approximately 75-80 percent 
of their budget from donations (Ikstens, 2008: 51).  
In Lithuania, one natural person is allowed to donate for each independent 
participant of the political campaign a donation that does not exceed an amount of ten 
average monthly salaries11 that equals to 6 370 euro for each independent participant. In 
the case when a candidate is financing own political campaign, a donation may not 
exceed twenty average monthly salaries that are equal to 12 740 euro per campaign. 
Another restriction limits these amounts: a donator must not donate more than ten 
percent of his annual income that was declared during the previous year. The legislation 
also proposes a simplified procedure for donations of natural persons that do not exceed 
the amount of 40 LTL (approx. 11.5 euro) for an independent political campaign. The 
Government of the Republic of Lithuania shall set up simplified procedure. However, 
still, it is not clear to which extent it will be simplified as even for small donors the 
disclosure of their identity is needed. The donation limit of ten percent of the income 
                                                 
10 The maximum donation amount is 19 000 Euro within 1 year in 2017. 
11 The minimum monthly salary in Lithuanian was 350 euro in the first half of 2016 and 380 euro - 
in the second half of 2016. As of 01 January 2017, this amount is 380 euro (Eurostat, 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat, acceses on 20.03.2017). However, the average monthly salary in Lithuania is 
637 euro (net) and 823 euro (gross) per month (by the data of Lithuanian Official Statistics Portal: 
http://osp.stat.gov.lt/en/home).  
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earned during the previous year is applied for small donators as well. This norm is 
vague. Indeed, all small donations must be public. A donator that is a natural person 
must declare his income and assets. Cash donations are allowed in the case they do not 
exceed 1000 LTL (approx. 287 euro12). Otherwise, bank transfer must be used 
(LFPP(lt), Chapter 2, Article 10). A political party is obligated to fill out the donation 
sheet for each donation separately and present it to the CEC (Ibid). Hence, this 
mechanism opens possibilities for rich donators who can make large donations legally. 
The fault of this mechanism is in the next: while making large donations, a wealthy 
donator may ask for lobbying of his interests by a political party; a political party that 
has a shortage in funding may accept proposed deal in exchange for financing. The 
other trick is that a single donator can make donations to several parties or independent 
candidates legally.  
Anonymous donations and donations made by legal persons are prohibited in the 
Baltic States. The PPA (§123) contains a list of other prohibited donations: “the transfer 
or the granting of use of goods, services or proprietary rights to a political party on 
conditions not available to other persons; release from ordinary binding duties or 
obligations; waiver of claims against a political party; payment of the expenses of a 
political party by third parties for the political party or making concessions to the 
political party, unless the payment of such expenses or the making of such concessions 
is also available to other persons in ordinary economic activities; donation made via a 
natural person and at the expense of the assets of a third party; donations by aliens, 
except for donations by persons holding the permanent right of residence or the status of 
a long-term resident in Estonia” (Eesti Vabariigi  Riigikogu, 2014).  
Latvian legislation does not indicate restricted donations per se. All donations 
must be done according to the law. The other obligation is that a political party must 
inform the KNAB about donation within 15 days after it was accepted. The KNAB 
publishes information about donations on its web page. The bureau has a right to 
examine whether a donation was made in compliance with the law, but within 45 days 
after the political party has informed about the donation. Latvia legislation foresees 
another five working days for further examination when it is needed. A political party in 
                                                 
12 This norm is four times lower in Lithuania than in Estonia (1200 euro).   
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Latvia has a right for considering whether to accept a donation or to transfer it back to 
donator after the donation was accepted (60 days). In the case of reimbursement of 
donation to a donator (a giver), a political party must also publish this information on its 
website (Latvijas Republikas Saeima, 2011). As we see, Latvia legislation does not 
define prohibited donation (except bans on donations made by legal persons and 
anonymous donators), but there is a list of requirements to the donator and the donation 
procedure. Also, the KNAB has wide controlling power over donations and other 
sources of funding of political parties in Latvia. That 60 days, given to a party to decide 
if to accept a donation may be seen as a “window” for corrupt manipulations. From one 
side a party has 15 days to notify the KNAB about donation, from the other side if 
something is wrong with this donation, it may be turned back. If to look at this system 
backwards, theoretically it is possible to prove that it provides incentives for political 
parties to hide donations. According to the research aimed to study financial systems of 
Latvian political parties in 2006-2007, “nine of eleven parties admitted that they use 
private donations as a way of funnelling corporate money into the party’s account. 
Some organisations use membership dues for that purpose as well” (Ikstens, 2008: 54). 
Another feature of Latvian legislation is that it does not prohibit political party 
entrepreneurship if it does not aim to make a profit. Parties do not pay corporate income 
tax as well. Nevertheless, political parties tend to avoid it (Ikstens, 2013: 11).     
In Lithuania the same as in Latvia and Estonia, political parties are not allowed to 
receive financing through the third persons. A party is prohibited use those monetary 
donations for a political campaign, which are not registered in the accounting records of 
a party or those for which donation sheet is not filled out. The legislation also provides 
remarks about donations that should not be regarded as unacceptable. The legislator 
insists that all donations must be made under Lithuanian legislation. However, there is a 
case when donation that exceeds ten percent of the total amount of the declared income 
of donator that was received during previous year may be accepted. It may happen in 
the case when according to the data available in the information system of the CEC at 
the moment of inquiry does not exceed ten percent of the annual income that is declared 
by the natural person for the previous calendar year (LFPP(lt), Article 11, Clause 3). 
Here there are questions to the legislator::  
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 What are the reasons that the information system of the CEC may not 
contain full data about the value of the total donation? Is it acceptable?  
 If previous donations were made in short time before the next one and 
information about the previous donation physically could not reach the 
CEC and the moment of inquiry information about the previous donation 
is missing, what will happen when after some time it will be found that 
previous donations fulfilled the limit of donator already, but the next 
donation was made as well?  
As outlined above, in the case when Estonian political party received restricted 
donations, these donations must be immediately returned to the donor where it is 
possible. However, in the case when it is not possible to return prohibited donations, 
they must be transferred to the state budget. Donations that are made in non-monetary 
form should be sold at the market price by a political party. It applies only to those non-
monetary donations which value is above 64 euro. The income from this operation must 
be transferred immediately to the budget. In the case the prohibited donation cannot be 
sold with reasonable efforts, it must be transferred in the other manner that is defined by 
the law (PPA, Ch. 21, §124).       
In Latvian case, the LFPP(lv) foresees a punishment if a political party does not 
include to annual report donations that exceed the amount of 100 minimum monthly 
salaries (LFPP(lv), Section 73). A political party may receive refusal from the KNAB to 
grant funding from the state budget. The existence of this statement in the legislations 
proves that despite great achievements in the area of political financing in Latvia, still 
there are gaps that parties use to violate the law. Here also there are questions to the 
legislator:   
 Is it allowed to hide donations which do not exceed that minimum?  
 Will be a political party punished if it hides from authority and publicity 
small amounts of different donations?   
Borrowing is the other private funding source of a political party. In Estonia, A 
political party can have credit relations only with credit institutions. All borrowings 
must be made on market conditions only. Legislator foresees that only political party 
property may be used to secure a loan agreement. Estonian legislation seeks for the 
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balanced funding mechanism of political parties. That is why the upper limit of the loan 
may not exceed 25 percent of the total sum allocated from the state budget. However, 
this rule is not applied to an election coalition or a political party whose funds were 
below 50 000 euro in the previous financial year (PPA, Ch. 21, §122). As we see, this 
norm gives advantages for small political parties in Estonia. In the case, when a political 
party will receive loans that do not correspond to the described norm, they are 
considered to be a prohibited donation and must be transferred immediately to the state 
budget. Borrowings were very popular in Latvia at the end of the 1990s, until they were 
forbidden in 2004. Loans in Lithuania are in the list of permanent sources of funding of 
political parties. The only restriction is that it should be banks that are registered in the 
Republic of Lithuania. It is also allowed to use loans during the political campaign.   
The examination of private funding of political parties in the Baltic States shows 
that the system was shaped significantly during 2004-2014 in three countries. The 
legislation of each Baltic state was amended with restrictions on the value and quantity 
of private donations; limitation on cash donations; publicity of donators and declaration 
of their legitimate income part of which will be donated. In the case of Estonia, the 
formation of the system of private funding was shaped in a way to make a balance 
between private and public funding of political parties. Public funding was introduced 
relatively late in Lithuania and Latvia. Hence, it was enough time to form “corrupt 
habits” of private political party financing. After the introduction of public funding, 
private funding restrictions were developed in a way to limit illegal private funding of 
political parties. However, it is not enough. It should be reached some balance that 
needs the balanced introduction of other elements that shape the system of funding of 
political parties in a country.         
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3.3 Other elements of financing regime of political parties    
 
The political financing regime requires some additional elements that will make the 
system more balanced. Among such elements is special access to the media, 
introduction of limits on spending of political parties, disclosure, reporting and strong 
oversight institutional mechanism. 
The special access to the media is an indirect state funding of political parties by 
its nature because political parties are granted some amount of free-time on public TV 
and radio. National agencies monitor this process with the aim to provide fair and equal 
access to media by each candidate and political party. The case of Estonia is unique 
because public television does not provide any political or non-political advertisements. 
“The state-run channel only broadcasts pre-election debates” (Sikk, Kangur, 2008: 66). 
The access to an advertisement on private TV and radio channels, first of all, depends 
on the financial ability of a political party to cover such expenses. Hence, the smaller 
political party is the more limited access to private mass media it has. The same is about 
independent candidates. Nevertheless, due to the absence of an upper limit on electoral 
campaign expenditures, bigger political parties that have better financial position benefit 
from private advertisement. Television is preferable for political advertisement in 
Estonia. However, experts do not see any discrimination that might be caused by such 
disparity, first of all, because of the high Internet penetration rate, various e-tools and 
election portals run by the Estonian Public Broadcasting (ERR) service. E-tools help 
candidates to keep their costs at a minimum and reach a wider public (SGI-Network, 
2016). 
A media access in Latvia is regulated by the Law on Parliamentary Pre-election 
Campaigns (in force since 1995) that laid out basic rules of political party advertising in 
public media during parliamentary election campaigns (Ikstens, 2013: 9). According to 
this law, a limited amount of free air-time on public television (40 minutes) and radio 
(four slots of five minutes on each13) has to be allocated equally to the registered 
                                                 
13 This norm was amended in 2014 prior OSCE/ODIHR recommendations. 
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political parties. The aim of this law is to minimise unfair campaign practices of 
receiving a “free air-time on public or commercial channels in addition to the amounts 
specified in the law” by a political party (Ikstens, 2013: 9; OSCE, 2014: 13). According 
to the position of the Supreme Court (2006), a public broadcaster in Latvia must follow 
“the principle of proportional equality as described in the Code of Good Practice in 
Electoral Matters issued by the Venice Commission” (Ikstens, 2013: 9). As of 2012, 
paid TV-advertisements are prohibited during a 30-day period before elections (SGI-
Network, 2016). The National Electronic Media Council oversees the media coverage 
of elections and its compliance with Latvia legislation (OSCE, 2014: 13). Nevertheless, 
the media system in general terms provides fair and balanced coverage in Latvia. 
However, there are some challenges: (1) “media outlets do not consistently provide fair 
and balanced coverage of the range of different political positions. (2) Local newspapers 
and electronic media in Latvia’s rural regions are often dependent on advertising and 
other support from the local authorities, sometimes leading to unbalanced coverage. (3) 
[The] opaque ownership structures of media outlets mean that support for political 
actors is often implied rather than clearly stated as an editorial position. (4) Corrupt 
political journalism has been prevalent across a wide spectrum of the media. (5) There 
are also marked imbalances in media coverage related to the different linguistic 
communities. For example, both Latvian and Russian language media demonstrate a 
bias toward their linguistic audiences” (SGI-Network, 2016). In Lithuania, political 
parties have equal and fair access to public mass media too. But the role of e-tools is 
neglected; television is still the primary source of political advertisement. The CEC 
regulates a form and a content of an advertisement and the media conduct in general 
during elections. A political advertisement “has to be clearly marked as such, should be 
at least 30 seconds, should include direct presentation of campaign platforms, and 
should not be published on the front pages of print media” (OSCE, 2016: 9). The CEC 
obligates media companies to declare the terms of political advertising in advance of the 
campaign period providing a detailed report on the time or space provided to a political 
party or a candidate. “The Radio and Television Commission, a media regulatory body, 
monitors all nationwide broadcasters and provides reports to the CEC. In the case of 
violation of media campaign rules, the CEC …[will] report on the offence and [will] 
send the case to a district court” (Ibid).  
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The introduction of spending limits of a political party is another regulatory 
element of political party financing regime. In the case of Estonia, there are no 
restrictions on expenditures in the PPA. Estonian legislation does not classify electoral 
expenses as well.  In Lithuania, all campaign expenditures must be paid from the 
account designed for this purpose only (LFPP(lt), Chapter 2, Article 17). There are also 
limitations on expenses that depend on where the constituency covers the whole 
territory of the country (1 LTL per one voter entered on the electoral roll) or only a part 
(2 LTL per one voter, but at least 20 000 LTL). The political campaign funds may be 
spent on (1) a political advertisement (production or distribution); (2) salary of political 
campaign treasurer; (3) a political campaign audit; (4) the rent of different kind of 
property and vehicles necessary for the campaign; (5) expenses for accommodation, 
meal and transportation of political campaign volunteers, representatives of political 
party, candidates or observers, etc. (Ibid, paragraph 4). Electoral deposit, transport 
expenses and accommodation of potential candidates or a candidate, expenditures under 
a legal service contract, other political party expenses related to the period other than 
political campaign period may not be considered as political campaign spending. In the 
case when a candidate collected more funds for the political campaign than it could be 
used to cover expenditures of the campaign, these unused funds must be transferred to 
the state budget. In the case of a political party, the remaining funds may be used by the 
political party to cover its further expenses (Ibid, paragraph 7-8). In Latvia, campaign 
spending limits were introduced in 2004. It is not allowed to a political party to use state 
budget and local authority resources for the electoral campaign. The LFPP(lv) sets up 
limits on spending of the funds allocated from the state budget (Section 74). A political 
party may spend public allocations for: “(1) premise hire, including the organisation of 
meetings, and services related to premise hire, including public utility services; (2) 
communication and Internet services; (3) work remuneration and other payments to 
natural persons connected with the operations of the relevant political organisation 
(party) or the operations of the association of the relevant political organisation (party); 
(4) sworn auditor services; (5) research work, polls and consultations; (6) the 
organisation of educational events intended for inhabitants, including public events, 
seminars, charity events, and the publication and distribution of books, informative 
materials, excluding the ensuring of catering services; and (7) political campaigns” 
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(Latvijas Republikas Saeima, 2011). In local elections, a political party is allowed to 
spend in pre-election period approximated 0.0004 euro per one vote gained “at the 
previous elections of the relevant local government council … [or] … in the relevant 
electoral district at the previous elections of the Saeima.” (Section 84). In the case of the 
Saeima or European Parliament elections, this coefficient is 0.0003 euro per vote in the 
previous elections (Latvijas Republikas Saeima, 2013). As we see, in all three cases 
there is an entirely different approach to the regulation of political expenditures: in 
Estonia, there are no spending limits, but it is prohibited to use public funding for the 
election campaign. In Latvia, spending limits are set up only to the allocations from the 
state budget while Lithuanian legislation regulates political campaign spending.  
Political parties in Latvia and Lithuania are entirely responsible for their 
expenditures that must be in compliance with the law. All their activity should be 
transparent. They must disclose all incomes and expenditures publicly during specified 
terms. In Estonia, a political party is obligated to present quarterly spending report 
which sets out the expenditures by categories: (1) costs connected to the party’s activity 
(operating costs); (2) labour costs; (3) administrative costs. The operating costs of a 
party are disclosed by the next categories: advertising costs by media type (television, 
radio, online, outdoor, newspaper advertising, printed materials), public relation, 
publication and public events costs, etc. (PPA, §121(8) - (11)). Together with the 
expenditures report, a political party has to present an accounting print out of payable 
bills and the balance sheet during ten days of the month following the quarter 
(§121(12)). In a year of elections, a political party has to present an election campaign 
expenses report within one month after the election. This report contains full 
information about payment receipt (date of issue, name and number), payment (amount, 
date of payment) and recipient of the payment (name, identification information, etc.). 
An annual report must be submitted together with the opinion of the certified auditor by 
30 June of the following year (§129). All these mentioned disclosure and reporting rules 
were amended recently (2014-2015) due to critics about the lack of transparency and 
absence of effective control over party financing in Estonia.   
Latvia has similar to Estonia procedure of costs declaration incurred during the 
election period. Additionally, political parties have to present an income declaration to a 
supervision body (LFPP(lv), Section 81), but the reporting period is the 120th day 
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before the election up to the election day. Latvian political parties have only three 
months to prepare an annual report(by 31 March each year) if to compare with Estonian 
half a year (by 30 June each year). Those political parties that receive public funding 
have to append a report on spending of the granted public funds (Section 85).  
In Lithuania, each political party has to disclose all incomes received for the 
political campaign by groups of donors including all incurred costs of the campaign and 
assumed liabilities in the “Political campaign funding report”. Additionally, all 
participants of a political campaign are obligated to submit a political advertisement 
report (indicating their funding sources) during 25 calendar days starting from the 
proclamation of final results. Annually, a political party has to submit to the supervision 
body a report on the use of public funding. An annual report consists of the balance 
sheet, performance report and explanatory note. An audit report has to be added as well. 
As we see, Lithuanian political parties have the shortest period among the Baltic States 
to present an annual report (by 15 March of the following year).  
A political party is obligated to disclose full information about its incomes and 
costs upon the first request of the supervision body in each Baltic state. The Political 
Party Financing Surveillance Committee (PPFSC) is an independent supervision body 
in Estonia. It consists of members appointed by political parties represented in the 
Parliament and representatives of the Chancellor of Justice, Auditor General and the 
National Electoral Committee (one member per institution or political party). The 
duration of the office is five years (ERJK, 2017). The committee monitors financial 
activity and observes the use of financial sources of political parties. The reporting 
period in the year of elections is during one month after it. This norm is in effect since 
1992. As of 1999, parties present quarterly and annual reports publicly over the Internet 
(Sikk, Kangur, 2008: 67).  As of 2013, political parties are obligated to report all their 
incomes and expenses of the accounting period from 1 January by the categories that are 
described above. Political parties must pay fines in the case of “violation the rules on 
the disclosure of donations and failing to file the economic activity reports” (Sikk, 
Kangur, 2008: 68). These fines are differentiated (PPA, Chapter 22). Estonian 
supervision committee has not only control and punishment functions, but also consults 
political parties how to overcome difficulties in funding and management (by the 
request of a party). Also, the committee has a right to appoint an auditor in the case of 
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need of a special audit by the committee’s previous decision. In such case, the cost of 
the audit is covered from the budget of the committee. Transparent International insists 
on possible bias of the PPFSC as (1) members of political parties are the majority that is 
needed to pass resolutions; (2) the committee has limited personal and “cannot always 
scrutinize the reports thoroughly or conduct background checks on the validity of 
information presented to them”; (3) the committee does not check whether an amount of 
donation corresponds to the income of donator (Transparency International, 2012: 9). 
The analytical agency SGI-Network reports that financing regulation in Estonia still has 
several loopholes: (1) “the alleged misuse of administrative resources by governing 
political parties to finance their electoral campaigns14” (SGI-Network, 2016) and (2) 
limited budget of the PPFSC that is not enough for the efficient work of the 
organization.  
In Latvia, the KNAB is an oversight institution that is Corruption Prevention and 
Combating Bureau. This organisation is independent and runs under the supervision of 
the Prime Minister of Latvia. The KNAB is composed of two main branches: 
prevention and investigation branches. The Division of Control of Political Parties 
Financing is one of the divisions of prevention branch. It monitors a compliance of all 
financial operations of political parties (donations, donations through the third party, 
anonymous donations, spending limits, pre-election expenditures, etc.) with the party 
financing regulation in Latvia and controls an illegal funding to be paid to the state 
budget. The division also deals with annual financial reports of political parties (KNAB, 
2017).  According to Section 8 of LFPP(lv), a political party must present a financial 
report within 30 days after the election. It must disclose all data about incomes and 
expenses of a political party during 120 days of pre-election period regarding all types 
of advertisements including cost for their creation and printing, mail services used for 
the distribution of pre-election materials, organization of election campaign and all 
sponsoring charity events (including gifts, etc.), all printed materials needed for the 
election campaign (including lists, newspapers, magazines, bulletins, books, etc.) and 
other expenditures by separate types. An annual report of a political party must be 
submitted to the KNAB each year by 31 March. (Another copy of this report must be 
                                                 
14 There are examples when court cases related to the 2013 municipal elections in Estonia were 
still pending two years later as of fall 2015 (SGI-Network, 2016). 
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submitted to the State Revenue Service). The KNAB inspects an annual report of a 
party within one year until the 1 April of the next year and informs Latvian society if a 
political party violated Latvian Law. A party that receives public allocations must 
present a report about money flow circulation indicating the amount of state allocation 
that was left at the beginning of the financial year and at the end (Section 85), report 
about incomes and detailed report about spending. It is worth to mention that Section 85 
“Annual Report” of LFPP(lv) indicates reporting requirements only for those parties 
that were granted public funding (Latvijas Republikas Saeima, 2011). Does it mean that 
in the year when there are no elections only those parties operate that receive public 
funding while small parties (those that did not meet the two percent threshold 
requirement) do not have financial resources and operate only in the year of the 
election?          
Despite having a wide range of tools to provide an adequate control of political 
financing and to combat corruption, many researchers consider the KNAB as a weak 
institution. It was established because of increased international attention to corruption 
in Latvia before the accession to the EU since the early 2000s. During last ten years, the 
KNAB had many inner scandals around the nomination of the head of the institution 
that actually influenced its image. Among another challenge is an orientation on 
preventive methods of corruption rather than combating it, low salaries that lead to the 
high turnover of personnel in the organisation and absence of qualified experts. 
The Central Electoral Commission (CEC) is an oversight institution in Lithuania. 
It is composed of Chairman of the Commission, two members appointed by the 
Minister of Justice; two members appointed by the Lithuanian Bar Association; two 
members appointed by the President of the Republic and members from parliamentary 
parties. Here we see the same principle of the composition of the regulatory body as in 
Estonia. The difference is in that how members from the political parties are nominated. 
It is more complicated procedure: prior the formation of the CEC parliamentary parties 
make a joint list of candidates. If a candidate from the list does not meet all 
requirements (such as university law degree and the experience of working in electoral 
committees), the Seimas may reject the nominee. The Secretariat of the Commission is 
represented by five units such as election organisation unit; finance unit; computer 
technologies unit; funding control of political parties and election campaign unit and 
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training and communication unit. The Law on the Central Electoral Commission (2002) 
regulates main functions and activities of the CEC. The CEC has wide supervisory 
power over election conduct, continuously monitoring power over financing aspects and 
media coverage during a political campaign (OSCE, 2016: 7; LFPP(lt), Ch.5, Art.26). 
Nevertheless, the CEC is criticised for being insufficient in the monitoring of the 
political parties financing, their transparency and accountability (Transparency 
International, 2013: 3). 
Hence, the role of supervisory bodies is very important in the framework of 
political party financing regime. Public funding is not popular among citizens. Its role is 
even diminishing when the supervisory committee has a weak position as it is in Latvia 
and Lithuania. Stricter oversight functions over political financing may conduct a more 
transparent political competition and higher trust in political parties in the Baltic States.   
 
 
3.4. Public trust in political parties in the Baltic States     
 
Public trust in political parties is one of the indicators of democratic development in a 
country. Trusting a political party means that a part of civil society in a country relies on 
a party and identifies itself with this party. It also means that the actions of this party 
take into account views and beliefs of the mentioned part of the society. Those people, 
who do not follow political development in a country precisely, quite often just compare 
a party they are in favour of an opposition party. They assume that favourite political 
party acts in their interests more often than the opposition party (Keel, 2016, p. 876). 
Vice versa, that part of the society that actively participates in political processes in a 
country is more in favour of political parties.      
Estonia re-established its independence and has chosen the way of fundamental 
changes such as the democratic development of the political system and implementation 
of the free market economy that influenced people’s lives and thinking values and 
beliefs. Tilma and Rämmer (2008) traced the dynamics of changing values during 1990-
1996 that was the first stage of the transition period for Estonia. The political system 
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and the economy were transformed simultaneously during mentioned period (Tilma, 
Rämmer, 2008: 292). Estonian citizens were highly involved in the political life of the 
state. But their trust depends on the level of confidence in state institutions. “The quality 
of the civil service and the performance of institutions can increase or decrease the level 
of support for the institutional system of the state” (Ibid).   
Table 3.3 contains the data for the year 1992 when Estonia already re-established 
its independence and just started to reform its economic and political systems and for 
the year 1996 when Estonia implemented some reforms, and it already passed two years 
since the introduction of public funding of political parties.    
Table 3.3 Trust in political parties in Estonia in 1992 and 1996, % * 
Trust Great deal Quite a lot Not very much Not at all Total 
1992 
in political system 
1 17 55 27 100 
1996 
in political parties 
1 22 46 31 100 
Data source: Tilma, Rämmer, 2008: 293-294 („Baltic Surveys“). 
In 1992 people who participated in the survey were asked a question if they are 
confident in the political system. But in 1996 the question was asked about confidence 
in political parties. The author assumes that these indicators are close to each other by 
the meaning. Hence, Table 3.3 indicates that only 18% of the Estonian population were 
confident15 in the political system in 1992. The number of those citizens who were 
confident in the political system but not very much was 55% and 27% of those who 
were not confident at all. In 1996, as we see, the share of those who were not much 
confident in the political system changed significantly. One part of these people joined 
the group of citizens who have more trust in political parties; the other part joined those 
who do not trust at all. Moreover, if to compare political parties with other institutions 
(for example, police, government, Estonian army, labour unions, etc.), they were the 
most mistrusted institutions during 1992 and 1996. “Only 20 percent of Estonians 
considered themselves supporters of a specific political party. … [In] 1994 as many as 
67 percent of the voters would have their electoral choices on individual rather than on 
                                                 
15 It is calculated as the sum of answers “Great deal” and “Quite a lot”. 
54 
 
party grounds” (Ruus, 2000: 12). The Baltic Barometer survey III provided the same 
data that confirms approx. one percent of Estonians trusted in political parties 
completely. But the number of those who had some general trust in political parties is 
lower (15 percent) than by the data presented by the “Baltic Surveys” (22 percent) 
(Ibid). Nevertheless, trust in political parties and other governmental institutions 
stabilised in 1996 till the beginning of the 2000s (Tilma, Rämmer, 2008: 296).  An 
introduction of the rule of 1000-members for the creation of a political party reduced the 
number of registered parties from thirty in 1995 to sixteen in 1999 in Estonia. The 
degree of political stability also depended  “upon the cohesion of the three party right-
of-centre coalition (Isamaa, Moderates and Reform Party) which came to power in April 
1999 with a slim 3-seat majority” (Smith, 2001: 105). However, in total, every third 
citizen did not trust in political parties while every fourth had the insignificant level of 
trust in political parties in Estonia. According to Ruus, low party politics was the most 
challenged consequence of low trust in political parties that was caused by undeveloped 
party system (Ruus, 2000: 12) due to the lack of adequate financing and experienced 
politicians in Estonia.          
Lithuania had a transition period the same as Estonia in the first half of the 1990s; 
the economy and politics were restructured simultaneously; private ownership and a 
multiparty system were successfully established (Alisauskiene, 2008: 255). It was 
introduced “the mixed-member proportional electoral system” that provided a” balance 
between representation and fragmentation” in the Seimas (Unikaite, 2008: 30). The 
second half of the 1990s is characterised “by relatively high levels of political 
participation and interest in politics” (Alisauskiene, 2008: 256). The Seimas was 
represented by the three strongest political parties (LDLP, HULC and LChDP) whose 
idea was to lessen the electoral competition and who were the initiators of main political 
changes aiming to create more beneficial system only to them. Nevertheless, the 1996 
parliamentary elections brought not well-known political parties to the parliament. This 
showed split in votes and distrust to the parliamentary parties (Unikaite, 2008: 31).  
Hence, surveys conducted during the 1990s indicated that “Lithuanian citizens are more 
likely to trust institutions with a symbolic role rather than the legislative and executive 
institutions” (Alisauskiene, 2008: 269). The other characteristic of voters in Lithuania 
was that they were “more likely to trust leaders and personalities instead of parties” 
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(Unikaite, 2008: 33).  Among political institutions, political parties were the least 
trusted at the end of the 1990s according to the data of “Baltic Surveys” (Table 3.4).         
Table 3.4 Trust in political institutions in Lithuania in 1997, %  
Trust Great deal Quite a lot Not very much Not at all Total 
Parliament 0.6 26.0 63.3 10.1 100.0 
Government 1.1 35.2 57.7 6.0 100.0 
Political parties 0.3 14.0 72.1 13.6 100.0 
Data source: Alisauskiene, 2008: 269 („Baltic Surveys“). 
Lithuanian interests in politics are cyclical and contextual – the closer the 
election, the higher interest in politics (Alisauskiene, 2008: 275). Table 3.4 indicates 
that in pre-election 1997-th only 14 percent of Lithuanians trusted in political parties. 
This number is two times lower than trust in parliament and three times lower than trust 
in government. 
The data of the World Value Survey (WVS) also indicates a decrease in trust in 
political parties in Lithuania at the end of 1990th (Table 3.5).  
 Table 3.5 Trust in political parties in Lithuania, %  
Year Great deal Quite a lot 
Not very 
much 
Not at 
all 
No 
answer 
Do not 
know 
Total 
1994-1998 1 0 12 62 12 0 14 100 
2005-2009 2 0 8 58 25 1 8 100 
Data source: 1 World Values Survey Wave 3; 2 World Values Survey Wave 5 (online analysis). 
As we see, by the data of World Value Survey only 12 percent of Lithuanians 
trusted in political parties in the second half of the 1990th; according to the Baltic 
Survey, this share was 14 percent. It was a period of the dominance of the three 
strongest political parties. An introduction of public financing of political parties was 
hotly discussed. Due to the economic crisis and absence of funding for the 2000 
parliamentary elections, the consensus was reached in this debate. Nevertheless, all this 
led to the low trust in political parties. The period of 2005-2009 is chosen for the 
analysis as the period after the next parliamentary elections that took place after the 
introduction of public funding in Lithuania. Table 3.5 shows, trust in political parties 
was characterized by the next trends: only 8 percent of citizens trusted quite a lot in 
political parties (instead of 12 percent in 1998) while the share of those who did not 
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trust at all became twice larger (25 percent) if to compare with 12 percent in 1998. 
According to the data of the Standard Eurobarometer 62, Lithuanian respondents were 
very similar to the average Europeans in their responses in autumn 2004. They were 
confident most of all in the European Union, electronic mass media, voluntary 
organisations and army. Political parties and government were the least trusted in 2004 
in Lithuania (European Commission, 2004: 5). Two main factors may explain this 
phenomenon:  
1) Weak position of political institutions in the country. Approximately 85 percent 
of Lithuanians distrusted all their institutions in 2000-2004. High level of political 
completion inside the country had led to the decline of trust in political parties in 
general.  
2) Lithuanians were characterised by high level of trust in European institutions 
since 2000, first of all, because of the future accession to the EU in 2004. 
“Lithuanians believe in the greater efficiency of European policy and bureaucracy, 
.. [were] disappointed with the capacities of their local authorities” (European 
Commission, 2004: 9). Hence, Lithuanians were more confident in politicians in 
Brussels than in domestic political institutions.     
Latvian society did not trust in political parties during the 1990s. Researchers 
explain this phenomenon by increased idea of restoration of independence of Latvia and 
increased political participation in the late 1980s that started to go down in the 
beginning of 1990s. “After 1991, political action was replaced by passivity and political 
apathy” (Koroleva, Rungule, 2008: 235). It happened because of a decrease in living 
standards after the implementation of reforms and people beliefs that politics are 
responsible for the social politics and individual welfare (Ibid). Hence, Latvians had 
relatively little trust in political parties at the 1990s (Table 3.6).  
Table 3.6 Trust in political parties in Latvia, %  
Year Great deal Quite a lot 
Not very 
much 
Not at 
all 
No 
answer 
Do not 
know 
Total 
1994-1998 1 0 10 45 41 0 5 100 
2005-2009 2 1 13 41 42 0 3 100 
Data source: 1 World Values Survey Wave 3; 2 World Values Survey Wave 5 (online analysis). 
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As we see from Table 3.6, more than 40 percent of Latvian citizens did not trust in 
political parties since the mid-1990s at all. Only every tenth citizen had some 
confidence in political parties in the 1990th, while since 2005 one percent of the 
population started to believe in Latvian political parties; the share of those who started 
to trust quite a lot also became larger. Nevertheless, the share of those who also had 
some little trust in political parties and those who do not trust at all remain more than 80 
percent.  
During 2004-2014, public trust in political parties remained relatively small. 
According to Providus, a Latvian think-tank, public trust in political parties was nine 
percent in 2004. In 2014, ten years later, it was on the same level – nine percent 
(Povidus, 2014: 10). By the data published in the Eurobarometer 71 in 2009, less than 
five percent of Latvian citizens trusted in political parties while 93 percent tended not to 
trust at all. Moreover, 88 percent of citizens do not trust in the Latvian government and 
91 percent in Saeima. It is the lowest level of distrust in political parties not only among 
the Baltic countries but in the EU. Nevertheless, after the accession to the EU, “trust in 
the EU remains at a comparatively high level – 44 percent, still, it is a bit lower 
percentage than in Europe on average” (European Commission, 2009: 8). But even in 
trust to the EU, Providus declares some level of decline in 2013 and 2014 (Providus, 
2014: 10). There are two general explanations why Latvian citizens do not trust in 
political parties: 
1) The system of flexible open lists for parliamentary elections does not work in 
Latvia as it should. Ideally, voters preferences define the rank-order of proposed 
candidates in the list that usually conduct an intra-party competition. The election 
campaigns in Latvia are “conducted in a centralised manner” with the emphasis on a 
leader of a party who attracts broader public support. Hence, the system is losing its 
trustworthiness.  A majority of Latvians believe that “current electoral system should be 
replaced by one which provides a closer link between voters and elected officials as 
well as fosters greater accountability of parties and members of parliament” (Ikstens, 
2008: 46).  
2) Latvia has the highest level of political corruption among the Baltic States.  It 
may be explained as the Soviet heritage. Corruption was seen as a core element of the 
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political system in USSR. Since the restoration of independence, private funding was 
the main source of political party financing. During 1990th, it was formed the corrupt 
political culture in Latvia. In the 2000s due to the future accession to the EU, Latvia 
was recommended to implement basic rules against political corruption. “We are still 
lagging far behind the “average European” in our belief that our vote counts. One of the 
most visible public battles of the past ten years has been the fight against corruption and 
for reducing the influence of money in politics” (Povidus, 2014: 10). Even though the 
system was reshaped during last ten years, political parties were not ready for painful 
changes and to cut illicit funding. Their resistance, unfair competition and new cases of 
corrupt during each election only reduced the level of public confidence in political 
parties in Latvia. 
 
     
3.5. Findings of the analysis  
 
Findings of the analysis are presented below separately by each country describing             
the relationships between the introduction of public funding and trust in political              
parties.  
 
Estonia  
Estonian politicians agreed on public funding introduction very fast in 1992. They 
had a clear idea of the new democratic state which they wanted to build. It was a clear 
understanding that only fair and transparent political competition could ensure it. State 
subsidies were foreseen even for small parties that could not obtain enough votes to 
enter the parliament. 
Public funding of political parties in Estonia came into effect in 1994. 
Immediately after the parliamentary elections of 1995, political parties were granted 
first state subsidies. These public funds helped to stabilise Estonian political system in 
the middle of the 1990s. Moreover, an amount of public funding was growing every 
year until the end of the 1990s. 
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Public trust in political parties in Estonia was unstable at the beginning of the 
1990s. Despite the fact that, Estonian population was highly engaged in political 
processes of the restoration of Estonian independence, trust in political parties was 
relatively low. Every second citizen had some little trust in political parties in 1992, 
while every fourth didn’t rust al all; only every sixth trusted a lot in political parties. As 
of 1996, one may observe a smooth declining shift in trust in political parties among 
Estonian population. From one hand, the share of those who were more confident in 
political parties started to grow. From the contrary, the share of those who did not trust 
in political parties slightly grew up as well. The share of those who were not too much 
confident in political parties decreased. Absolute trust in political parties had only one 
percent of the population during the whole period since 1991st. There are several 
reasonable explanations of the cleavage in trust in political parties: 
1) After the restoration of independence, Estonian population became less and less 
engaged in political processes. It was a time of finding decisions for domestic 
challenges inside the country. The population was divided into three major groups: (1) 
those that stood for the economic transformations supported by politicians inside the 
country, (2) those that were against such transformations, and (3) those that were in 
between first two groups; their number was decreasing.  
2) Estonian population was characterised by different attitudes towards the way of 
political development in the country and historical memory between Estonian and non-
Estonian (Russian) communities. Ethnic Estonians enjoy a higher level of trust in 
political parties (Titma, Rämmer, 2008: 294).  
3) Everyday politics demanded highly professional politicians and leaders. But 
being newly independent country, Estonian politicians needed some time to find right 
solutions to domestic challenges and implementation of the reforms. As we see, it has 
an impact on trust in political parties starting from 1992-1993. The other point is that 
everyday politics were boring in independent Estonia because leading political parties 
reached consensus on many topical questions in a very short period of time. An 
introduction of public funding helped political parties to concentrate on domestic 
challenges and stabilised the level of trust on the same level.   
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Lithuania  
The case of Lithuania is different. Public funding was introduced relatively late, in 
1999. Private funding was the primary source during 1990. Donations, membership fees 
and loans held the largest share in the financing of political parties. The idea of public 
funding introduction was proposed in 1997. However, parties agreed on it when they 
felt a shortage in financing due to the economic crisis in 1998 – 1999. The majority of 
Lithuanian population was against it. Political parties received first public subsidies at 
the end of 2000 that were distributed among the parliamentary parties. Nevertheless, 
there were claims that this funding was not enough to cover operational costs of parties. 
Public trust in political parties was relatively low in Lithuania starting from 1991. 
Unfair political competition among biggest parliamentary parties made its contributed 
to declining in trust in political parties during the 1990s. Social surveys showed that 
Lithuanian population was not confident in political parties as they were exploiting the 
state and political system. The situation did not change drastically even after the 
introduction of public funding.  
Public trust in political parties was measured in terms of distrust. Distrust in 
political parties was more than 70 percent. The relatively negative shift in distrust in 
political parties is seen during 2005-2009 when a number of people who had some little 
trust in political parties joined the group of those who do not trust at all. Distrust in 
Lithuanian political parties also may be explained by very high trust in European 
institutions instead of domestic ones.  
Latvia  
Latvia is an extreme case in this case study. Private funding such as donations and 
membership fees was the primary source of political financing. During twenty years, 
since the restoration of independence, the illegal culture of political financing was 
formed in Latvia. Public funding was introduced in Latvia very late – in 2011 and came 
into force in 2014 by the pressure of the European Union as a countermeasure to defeat 
political corruption in the country.  
Public trust in political parties in Latvia is the lowest not only among the Baltic 
States but in the whole Europe. Latvian population was highly engaged in all political 
processes during 1989 – 1991, the same as in Estonia. In some years, Latvian 
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population became passive and out of politics. There were two primary reasons: the first 
one connects to unfair political competition and manipulations with flexible open lists 
for parliamentary elections. The other reason is that after implementation of reforms the 
level of life in Latvian drastically decreased. It was a naive Soviet belief that only 
politicians are responsible for the level of life in a country. Moreover, political 
corruption started to grow. New scandals related to political financing appeared during 
each election. An introduction of public funding did not change the situation. Political 
parties that used to illicit funding cannot easily refuse from comfortable schemes of 
financing. The biggest role in the implementation of public funding regime in Latvia 
has been given to anti-corruption bureau that has oversight function over political 
financing. However, absent common view on who must be a head of the agency, inner 
competition, low level of salaries, the absence of tools, labour and financial resources to 
exercise oversight functions fully created even higher distrust in combating corruption 
process and in political parties in Latvia in general.  
The other finding is that political financing regime in Latvia is the most regulated 
among the Baltic States. It leads to the point that well balanced political financing 
regime does not mean the presence of a big number of bans and limits on political 
financing. The crucial role in this system belongs to political culture in a country.       
 
 
. 
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CONCLUSIONS  
 
The aim of this thesis was to learn financing systems of political parties in Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania and to test relationships between an introduction of public funding 
and public trust for in political parties. 
It was found that theoretical literature on political financing is numerous but very 
fragmented. Many researchers study only public funding, private funding and 
interrelations between these two elements of political financing. Only several 
researchers study an influence of other elements on the funding system of political 
parties. That was the logic why this thesis provides an overview of the whole political 
financing regime and defines its main principals. The logic of theoretical approach to 
public trust in political parties was to show which relationship it has to political 
financing regime.  
The comparative analysis of three case studies was conducted in this thesis. All 
three case studies have well-developed legislation on political financing aiming to find a 
balance between public and private funding. Nevertheless, state subsidies are the 
primary source of political party financing in Estonia while in Latvia and Lithuania 
private funding prevail.  
The main hypothesis of this research was proved by the case of Estonia, where 
public funding was used to stabilise political competition in the country and gave an 
impetus for further healthy competition.  
Nevertheless, the proposed hypothesis does not work for the cases of Lithuania 
and Latvia. Public funding was introduced relatively late in this countries after when 
illicit funding became a very comfortable habit for political parties.    
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 The hypothesis may be criticised that public funding is not popular among 
citizens in a majority of countries in the worlds. And many other factors have an 
influence on trust in political parties. However, it to look at public trust using before-
and-after approach (as it was done in the analytical part), the links between public 
funding of political parties and trust in political parties are visible.    
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